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Abstract

Unauthorized access to communication networks remains at the forefront of security concerns for Information Technology (IT) based systems. These concerns are
increasing within the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) community as ICS architectures migrate away from legacy IT implementations to modern Internet Protocol (IP)
connections. More specifically, the connections that carry critical communications
to/from control devices within an ICS are in need of improved security measures to
enhance authentication reliability for remote devices and users. Research in Physical
Layer (PHY) security mechanisms for wired network devices has been largely ignored
and is considered here as a way to augment bit-level security protocols.
This research compared performance of two Distinct Native Attribute (DNA) fingerprinting methods for discriminating device hardware. The first technique was
adopted from prior work and is called Radio Frequency-Distinct Native Attribute
(RF-DNA) Fingerprinting. RF-DNA Fingerprinting has been widely used for wireless device discrimination and was adopted here to enable comparison with the newly
developed Constellation Based-Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) Fingerprinting
technique. At its core, the CB-DNA implementation leverages unique PHY attributes
to extract device dependent features to enable both Device Classification as a 1 vs. M
“Looks Most Like?” assessment, and Device ID Verification as a “Looks How Much
Like?” assessment for authenticating bit-level credentials. A Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) technique was used to collect communication bursts from Ethernet cable
emissions for use with both fingerprinting techniques. The RF-DNA technique uses
only the preamble response from the communication burst to generate device fingerprints. The CB-DNA technique uses the entire burst response and a non-conventional
iv

signal constellation developed to support the research. The independent and dependent symbol projection regions within the non-conventional constellation are used
to generate statistical fingerprint features. The real benefit of CB-DNA lies within
the dependent constellation regions, the statistical variation of which vastly improves
serial-number discrimination over the RF-DNA technique.
The Cross-Model Discrimination (CMD) results for RF-DNA and CB-DNA Device
Classification using identical collected bursts show that both methods can easily discriminate devices from four different device manufacturers, with an arbitrary benchmark of percent correct classification (%C) greater than 90% achieved for both methods. Like-Model Discrimination (LMD) discrimination, historically has presented the
greatest discrimination challenge, and is performed using 16 total devices, four each
from four manufacturers. CB-DNA LMD Fingerprinting benefits considerably with
the introduction of subcluster DNA features. Improvement across the range of Signalto-Noise Ratio (SNR) considered includes an approximate: 1) 5% to 22% increase in
%C, and 2) 5 to 19 dB of “gain,” measured as the reduction in required SNR relative to what is required for aggregate features to achieve the same %C. Relative to
best case RF-DNA performance, CB-DNA is clearly superior and provides 1) nearly
22% of %C improvement at collected SN R = 16 dB, and 2) 9 dB or more “gain”
for %C ≥ 70, where gain is the reduction in SNR relative to what is required by
RF-DNA to achieve the same %C. The Device ID Verification results for RF-DNA
included an average Rogue Reject Rate (RRR) of RRR = 85% and CB-DNA achieved
RRR = 85.5%. A Constellation Point Accumulation (CPA) enhancement was introduced for CB-DNA, which was not implementable in RF-DNA, and increased Rogue
rejection performance to RRR = 93%.

v
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EXPLOITATION OF UNINTENTIONAL ETHERNET CABLE EMISSIONS
USING CONSTELLATION BASED-DISTINCT NATIVE ATTRIBUTE
(CB-DNA) FINGERPRINTS TO ENHANCE NETWORK SECURITY

I. Introduction
The research involved investigating the exploitability of Ethernet cable emissions
for the purpose of achieving reliable device hardware discrimination. The end result
was successful development and demonstration of a new Constellation Based-Distinct
Native Attribute (CB-DNA) Fingerprinting process. This chapter provides the operational and technical motivation behind CB-DNA development, including the operational motivation in Section 1.1 and technical motivation in Section 1.2. Section 1.3
summarizes research contributions and shows their relationship with prior related
work. The organizational structure of the document is covered in Section 1.4.

1.1

Operational Motivation
Over the last 40 years computer networks have permeated our everyday lives.

Information can now be shared in a matter of seconds rather than days or weeks, and
almost 40 percent of the world’s population is connected to the Internet [53]. Data
network proliferation and interconnectivity benefits have also introduced millions of
potential victims to cyber attacks by providing an avenue for hackers to reach their
victims. The use of computer networks to help defend our country has expanded
considerably over the last 20 years. Networks are prevalent in every mission aspect,
including weapons system deployment and in performance of our daily duties. To
complete its mission, our military employs seven million computing devices that are
1

connected by more than 15,000 data networks [9]. Many security issues today are
due to a lack of emphasizing security in the early years of cyber system development.
Many of these systems still exist today and fixes are being applied as issues are
discovered resulting in a patchwork of fixes. This raises the question of how many
vulnerabilities remain to be discovered and can we find and fix them before our
adversaries do? The United States infrastructure has experienced a “17-fold increase
in computer attacks” between 2009 and 2011 [52]. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) recently stated that cyber attacks are “one of the most severe national
security threats to the United States [9].”
Sun Tzu, a Chinese military general and philosopher, once said “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting [69].” Cyber warfare
is relatively cheap when compared to traditional warfare and it provides an attack
vector for our adversary to potentially degrade our military abilities and disrupt our
civilian institutions without physical conflict.
Cyber security threats remain on the top ten lists of multiple security-minded
enterprises. They have been identified as:
• the #1 concern of Fortune 1,000 companies for five years in a row according to
a 2014 survey [55];
• the #2 concern of the American Security Project in 2015 [30];
• the #3 concern of the United States Intelligence Office in 2012 [3].
As the U.S. modernizes its legacy Industrial Control Systems (ICS) implementations from Information Technology (IT) monitoring and control to more modern
Internet Protocol (IP)-based solutions, the noted security threats are becoming a reality in the ICS arena [29]. Many ICS control devices are moving to IP-based solutions
(Modbus/TCP, Ethernet/IP, and DNP3) to provide critical communications [7, 61].
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A reoccurring theme for these systems is security vulnerability. Critical platforms
are inadequately protected, direct access to equipment by non-essential personnel is
prevalent, and open wireless and wired access ports on office walls remains a problem [46, 58]. Many ICS architectures and protocols were designed and built without
considering security or verification of remote users/devices [46, 61]. As the sophistication of attacks increases, these vulnerabilities are being exploited by attackers to
gain network access to hardware, operating systems, or executables [46].
In 2011, the United States Department of Defense deemed cyberspace the fifth
warfare domain alongside land, sea, air, and space highlighting the importance of
protecting our infrastructure and civilian enterprises. Our leaders understand now
more than ever, that the landscape of cyberspace is changing. As stated by General
Alexander, Commander of the United States Cyber Command, before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services on 27 March 2012, “cyberspace is becoming more
dangerous.” There are those who believe [40,45] that the cyber environment is turning
into the new intelligence gathering efforts of early 1960s and Cold War era.
Network services for Ethernet devices and connections have been standardized
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) which introduced the
Open System Interconnect (OSI) model depicted in Figure 1.1. The seven layer
model divides networking communication into seven segments for protocol implementation. Network security implementation normally takes place at the “Data Link”
and “Network” layers at which point devices are either granted or denied network access [28,50,62,65]. It has been shown that the security protocols in place at these layers
provides an avenue for an attacker to spoof the bit-level security credentials of these
layers [5, 13, 18]. The first OSI model layer is considered the Physical Layer (PHY)
and has the potential to provide a vast amount of discriminating data that currently
is being ignored by the higher OSI layers for network security.
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Preventing unaut horized network access is necessary to help limit t he intelligence
gat hering efforts of our adversaries. This research investigates Et hernet cable emissions t hat contain PHY att ributes to augment traditional network security protocols
such as Media Access Control (MAC) credent ials t hat can be easily spoofed t hrough
net work monitoring [28). T he variat ions in t he manufacturing process for network
devices are enough t o cause slight variations in t he PHY signaling attributes of each
device such t hat unique feat ures can be extracted from a given signal to increase t raditional security mechanisms [15, 20, 35]. T he research presented takes t he Et hernet
emissions and ut ilizes t he unique features present in t he device signal to augment
current network security protocols. The newly developed approach improves device
discriminat ion through an increase in 1) Device Classificat ion, 2) Device Ident ification (ID) Verificat ion, and 3) the rejection of rogue devices requesting network access.
Prior research in t he area focused heavily on wireless device discrimination and have
shown t hat the unique feat ures are useful for security augmentation [20).
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1.2

Technical Motivation
A side channel is a result of a system or device’s implementation such that an

output, whether intentional or not, leaks information relevant to specific operations
or data within the system or device. The knowledge base for Side-Channel Analysis
(SCA) is extensive and covers many decades of research to include intentional and
unintentional byproducts [14–17, 21, 22, 24, 26, 34, 39, 41, 56, 59, 60, 64, 71, 72, 75, 77].
Some pertinent exploitable side channels include network traffic (intentional) [14, 41]
and unintentional Radio Frequency (RF) emissions. The unintentional RF emission
research can be divided into multiple subareas to include 1) components [15–17, 59,
60, 75], 2) peripherals [21, 22, 34, 39, 64, 71, 72], and 3) cables [22, 56].
The ability to use PHY attributes (RF fingerprinting) as a means to perform device discrimination is not new and there is extensive research in this area covering
many decades. Typical utilization of PHY attributes includes generation of unique
discriminating features within transient, invariant or entire burst responses [20].
Transient-based approaches [4, 68, 70] are generally avoided given the transient response 1) has limited duration, and 2) is influenced by environmental conditions that
affect the communication channel and limit its usefulness [19]. The invariant approaches as in [31–33, 48–51, 73, 74] extract device dependent features from a specific
non-data modulated Region of Interest (ROI) within the burst (preamble, midamble,
etc.). The entire burst is typically used in Constellation Based (CB) approaches as
in [6, 19, 20, 25, 35] to extract features from data modulated ROI where device dependent modulation errors exists between the ideal transmitted symbols and the received
symbols.
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1.2.1

Side Channel Analysis (SCA).

Most early SCA literature [34,39,56,64,71,72] focuses on far-field device emissions
to recover data being leaked by the device. As a research area, SCA has a considerable knowledge base, but it was evident that there was a gap in this research area
such that Ethernet cable emissions have yet to be explored as an exploitable byproduct. The focus for this research is to collect unintentional near-field emissions using a
similar process and probe setup used in [15, 60,75] and described in Section 3.1. This
research effort will then utilize the collected emissions to 1) provide the ability to perform symbol estimation on collected emissions enabling confirmation of payload data
and burst destination by an outside system, and 2) enhance traditional MAC based
authentication processes through the creation of a non-conventional constellation for
device feature extraction.
The details for a Single Slope (SSLP) symbol estimation process are provided in
Section 3.4.1 and an expanded CB approach is covered in Section 3.4.3. The latter
CB symbol estimation technique creates a non-conventional constellation from the
Ethernet emissions and is what enables the development of a CB-DNA Fingerprinting
process.

1.2.2

Constellation-Based (CB) Fingerprinting.

At the beginning of this research, it became clear that there was limited literature
addressing wired PHY augmentation to MAC based authentication using PHY-based
Distinct Native Attribute (DNA) features to form device fingerprints. The conceptualized fingerprinting approach for wired Ethernet devices utilizes new conditional
constellation regions not present in prior related works [6, 19, 25]. It is required that
symbol estimation from collected emissions generate fingerprints that are adequate
for device discrimination for both Cross-Model Discrimination (CMD) defined here as
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between different manufactures and Like-Model Discrimination (LMD) defined here
as between different devices with the same model number and manufacturer.
Current literature in wired device discrimination only contains a correlation based
approach [27, 28] which collects Ethernet burst preambles directly from the network
card for comparison against a training data set. A couple of drawbacks to this approach is 1) it requires direct access to network card for collection, and 2) it requires
sample rates at or greater than 1 Giga samples/sec (GSps).
The current literature in wireless device discrimination utilizes symbol estimation for traditional constellation based signals such as Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) and Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM). The vast
majority of these techniques create features from errors between the estimated symbol and the ideal symbol location [6, 19, 25, 35]. This approach provides adequate
device discrimination for wireless devices but is limited to signals that are modulated
using a traditional constellation. The Ethernet protocols for PHY signaling do not
utilize a traditional constellation for signal modulation which further complicates the
issue, i.e., the collection process captures a transformed version of the communication
burst and not an ideal modulated signal representation.
Development details for the CB-DNA process are described in Section 3.7 and
builds upon Section 3.4.3 that takes a non-constellation modulated signal and projects
its symbols into a non-conventional constellation space. This proved to be an effective
means for implementing CB-DNA Fingerprinting and discriminating devices.
At the time of this research, a direct comparison between fingerprinting processes
utilizing the same collected emissions has yet to be conducted. Therefore, the Radio
Frequency-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) Fingerprinting process outlined in
Section 2.3 will be accomplished in parallel with the newly developed CB-DNA Fingerprinting process on the unintentional Ethernet emissions and results compared.
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The goal is to find which fingerprinting process provides the best classification performance for this type of signal.
As the methodology and implementation of device discrimination via PHY attributes increases in maturity and approaches operational transition, it may be necessary to improve fingerprinting discrimination performance. Other RF-DNA implementations have looked at discovering a more robust feature set through Dimensional
Analysis Reduction (DRA) which reduces the number of features needed to perform
discrimination while keeping the performance degradation to a minimum [48–50].
This technique does provide for an operational implementation that has a smaller
footprint but a drawback is a potential in discrimination performance. Process enhancements such as Constellation Point Accumulation (CPA) and Projection Point
Averaging (PPA) are investigated with the goal of improving overall verification performance. The enhancements have the ability to provide an increase in performance
that negates the degradation from DRA.

1.3

Research Contributions
The technical areas mentioned in previous sections are summarized in Table 1.1

and provide a relational mapping between previous work in these areas and current
contributions presented in this dissertation. Some previously undefined acronyms contained within the table include: Time Domain (TD), Spectral Domain (SD), Gabor
Transform (GT), Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML),
Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantized-Improved (GRLVQI), Support Vector Machine (SVM), k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA),
and Subclass Discriminant Analysis (SDA)
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1.4

Document Organization
The remainder of the document is organized as follows. Chapter II provides rele-

vant background information on topics utilized for this research to include SCA, the
adopted RF-DNA Fingerprinting approach, 10BASE-T Ethernet standard, and the
device discrimination process. Chapter III provides the methodology for experimental
emission collection, post-collection processing, symbol estimation of wired emissions,
the adopted RF-DNA implementation, development of the CB-DNA Fingerprinting
technique, implementation of Device Classification and Device ID Verification, and
finally some enhancements for CB-DNA and additional verification metrics. Chapter IV presents the CMD and LMD classification results, LMD device ID verification,
LMD ID verification enhancements, and lastly a sensitivity analysis associated with
probe orientation. Chapter V provides the research summary and conclusion, as well
as a brief discussion on potential future work.
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Table 1.1. Relational Mapping Between Current Research Contributions and Technical
Areas of Previous Work. The X Symbol Denotes Areas Addressed.

Technical Area

Previous Work
Addressed

Ref #

TD Features

X

[36, 37, 50, 63, 73, 74]

SD Features

X

[16, 17, 51, 73]

GT Features

X

[49–51]

CB Features

X

[6, 19, 20, 25, 35]

Correlation

X

[27, 28]

Current Research
Addressed Ref #
X

[12]

X

[11, 12]

Emission Type
Intentional

X

[31, 36, 37, 50, 63, 73, 74]

Unintentional

X

[15–17, 59, 60]

X

[10–12]

Burst

X

[31, 36, 37, 50, 63, 73, 74]

X

[10–12]

Continuous

X

[15–17, 59, 60]

X

[11, 12]

X

[11]

X

[10–12]

RF SSLP

X

[10, 11]

CB-Based

X

[11]

X

[10–12]

Classification / Verification Process
MDA/ML

X

[36, 37, 50, 73, 74]
[15–17, 31, 51]

GRLVQI

X

[37, 49, 51]

SVM

X

[6, 19, 25]

kNN

X

[6, 19]

LDA/SDA

X

[35]

Classification / Verification Devices
Wireless Devices

X

[31, 36, 37, 50, 51, 73, 74]

Wired Devices

X

[27, 28]

Device Operations

X

[59, 60]

Wired Emission Symbol Estimation

Side Channel Analysis
Unintentional Emissions

X

[21, 22, 24, 26, 34]
[39, 41, 56, 71, 72]

Process Enhancements
DRA

X

[48–50]

CPA

X

[6, 35]

PPA

X
X
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II. Background

2.1

Introduction
This chapter provides background information and key concepts supporting the

research methodology in Chapter III and research results presented in Chapter IV.
Section 2.2 provides a brief history of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) as used to capture and exploit unintentional Radio Frequency (RF) emissions from digital devices.
The goal is to extract information that can be used to passively characterize device
operation or system configuration. RF Fingerprinting is addressed in Section 2.3,
to include a description of Radio Frequency-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA)
in Section 2.3.1 as adopted for comparison with the newly developed Constellation
Based-Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) presented in Section 3.7. Details for
previous Constellation Based (CB) discrimination techniques that utilize intentional
emission features are presented in Section 2.3.2 for completeness. Standard Ethernet
10BASE-T characteristics are covered in Section 2.4. The final sections address device discrimination as two distinct, equally important, related processes as depicted
in Figure 2.1. First, the 1 vs. M Device Classification assessment process is described
in Section 2.5 and a description of Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classification is provided. Second, the 1 vs. 1 Device Identification
(ID) Verification assessment is described in Section 2.6.
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F igur e 2.1. D iagram o f research p ath s taken for C B-DNA Fingerprint ing developm e n t
a nd dem on strat ion .

2.2

Side C h annel Analysis (SCA )
It is common knowledge that digital devices leak information in t he form of Elec-

t romagnet ic (EM) emissions. The German army successfully carried out side-channel
attacks as early as WWI on field phone lines ut ilizing far-field emissions [24]. Since
then, side channel attacks have expanded to other elect ronic devices. The miniaturization of components and decreases in production costs has enabled the shrinking of
entire devices and opened up a wide area of potential eavesdropping risks.
Cathode Ray Thbe (CRT) monitors have been widely exploited in literat ure using
the EM emissions result ing from video signal processing [39, 64, 71]. In 1985, it was
first discovered that video displayed on a CRT could be reproduced on a TV screen
when the TV receiver was tuned to the appropriate frequency [71]. T he EM radiation
from a CRT monitor is a direct result of the several hundred volt signal required to
operate the monitor. It was discovered t hat the amplified CRT signal was very similar
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to that of a broadcast television signal and theoretical eavesdropping distance for
some displays could be as high as 1 km. Moreover, adding additional CRT monitors
to the room did not mask the signals with additional noise because each monitor
resonated at a separate frequency which simply enabled an attacker to view more
screens. Since the original CRT exploration in 1985, several others such as [22,39,64]
have all accomplished similar attacks each focusing on slightly different SCA aspects.
The work in [39] advanced EM emanation exploitation by disguising hidden transmissions in video display signals. In this case, the video display unit was used to
transmit an audio signal that could be picked up with an AM radio. This enabled the
transmission of computer data to an eavesdropping station at a rate of approximately
Rb = 50 Bits/Sec (BPS) [39]. A second type of attack, more along the lines of [71],
hid images behind those displayed on the monitor so that the eavesdropper could
capture the hidden image on another monitor. A dithering technique which changes
the screen pixel modulation was used to carry out these various attacks.
A method to calculate the maximum eavesdropping distance for video emanations
being transferred to an Ethernet cable was subsequently developed in [22]. This
earlier work determined that an experimental distance of De = 29.5 m was the max
distance for video reconstruction. However, the paper itself appeared to have some
contradicting statements, and its last few sections lacked structure and rigor.
A novel approach is considered in [21] to recover and detect the keystrokes of a
PS/2 keyboard. Crosstalk and EM coupling is used to investigate the information
leakage from a computer with a PS/2 keyboard. It was determined that the EM
coupling of keyboard keystrokes was present in the power ground line, i.e., at the
power outlet. The factors enabling signal propagation are a lack of shielding in the
PS/2 cable, data encoded on sharp rise and fall edges of the clock, and frequency
of the transmission. Once the data signal is on the PS/2 ground line cable it can
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propagate to the ground plane through the power outlet.
The potential for EM-based eavesdropping on an RS-232 cable has been investigated using a standard radio receiver [56]. The eavesdropping was successful for
multiple reasons, including: 1) use of high frequency transmissions, 2) use of large
signal amplitudes, 3) no cable shielding, 4) serial data transmission, and 5) low bit
transmission rates. It was shown in [56] that RS-232 cable eavesdropping can occur
at distances of De = 9 m and De = 7 m between the AM radio and the unshielded
and shielded cable, respectively. The only requirement for this type of attack is an
AM/FM radio with a few minor modifications and a way to store the received signal.
One drawback is that distances are reduced when one piece of equipment is connected
to a proper ground.
The work presented herein expands on prior SCA techniques by collecting RF emissions from an Ethernet cable and performing symbol estimation to extract addressing information and payload data from individual
Ethernet frames.
2.3

Radio Frequency (RF) Fingerprinting
RF Fingerprinting is a generic term used to describe techniques that utilizes RF

emissions, whether intentional or unintentional, to create a digital fingerprint from
unique features contained within the emissions. The generated fingerprints are then
used to perform discrimination between devices or specific device states. Device
hardware fingerprinting is possible due to variations in manufacturing processes and
device components. These variations inherently induce Physical Layer (PHY) feature
differences that vary across devices [35]. Amplifiers, capacitors, inductors and oscillators also possess slight imperfections that influence device fingerprints [6,19,25,35].
The resultant variation can cause deviations in communication symbol rate, center frequency, and AM/FM/PM conversion [35]. Thus, “it is possible to exploit
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device imperfections even when the intrinsic components used are supposedly identical [17, 20]” [12].
A physical layer identification survey by [20] summarizes various RF Fingerprinting approaches used to create digital fingerprints into three basic approaches 1) transient responses, 2) invariant responses non-data modulated, and 3) varying data modulated burst response regions. “Transient-based approaches are generally avoided
given [19] 1) the limited duration of the transient response, and 2) the transient response being influenced by environmental conditions that affect the communication
channel and limit its usefulness [12].” It is for those two reasons the research presented
in this document focuses on the two approaches that utilize the invariant and varying
responses to perform device fingerprinting. Section 2.3.1 provides the background details on RF-DNA approach which utilizes the invariant response region. Section 2.3.2
provides background on previous work in the area of varying (data modulated ) burst
response regions.

2.3.1

RF-DNA Fingerprinting.

This section provides an introduction to traditional RF-DNA fingerprinting and
the techniques associated with it. The conventional RF-DNA implementation historically extracts the invariant (non-data modulated ) [16, 17, 31, 32, 36, 48, 50, 51, 59,
63, 73, 74] burst responses. A few of these implementations include Time Domain
(TD) [48], Spectral Domain (SD) [73], Fourier Transform (FT) [73], and Gabor Transform (GT) [51] and then generate features from various Region of Interest (ROI) (i.e.,
transient, amble, and preamble). Another use for RF-DNA fingerprinting is to detect normal or abnormal behavior of programmable logic components as described in
[60,75]. Here, a low sensitivity RF probe is used to collect near-field emissions from a
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) in an effort to digitally fingerprint a series of
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operations that the device performs. The capability of this approach provides a way
to tell whether or not a device is genuine and its original design has not been altered
by additional logic gates.
Prior to this research, the majority of the previous research in RF-DNA fingerprinting has relied on intentional signal responses of wireless devices [36, 48, 51, 63,
73, 74] to perform device fingerprinting. However, the research presented here uses
the technique introduced in [10] and explained in Section 3.1 for collecting unintentional RF emissions from Ethernet cables to produce RF-DNA fingerprints on a
burst-by-burst basis for wired network cards. The subsequent paragraphs discuss the
adopted RF-DNA approach described in [49, 50]. The relevant parameters associated
with fingerprint generation are covered in Section 3.6 and are used to generate the
discrimination results presented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5.
RF-DNA uses the steady-state response of the communication signal usually in
the form of an “amble”, and extracts native attributes to create a feature-based fingerprint [17,48–51]. This work adopts the RF-DNA fingerprinting approach utilizing the
specifics of the RF-DNA procedures outlined in [17, 50, 59] for Time Domain (TD)
responses and is restated here for completeness. Traditional RF-DNA TD fingerprinting starts by partitioning the ROI into subregions and finding the instantaneous
amplitude, phase, and frequency responses of the individual subregions.
Individual RF-DNA fingerprints F RF are generated from Nk samples extracted
from a real-valued discrete signal defined as cs(k). The number of individual TD
feature responses Nresp = 3 and consists of amplitude {āc (k)}, phase {φ̄c (k)}, and
frequency {f¯c (k)} with k = 1, . . . , Nk as provided in (2.1) - (2.3). Before the instantaneous phase (2.2) and frequency (2.3) can be calculated, the real-valued signal cs(k)
must first be converted into I-Q samples via the Hilbert transform [42], which results
in cs(k) = csQ (k) + csI (k) where
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a(k) =

p
cs2 (k),

φ(k) = tan

−1




csQ (k)
,
csI (k)



1 dφ(k)
f (k) =
.
(2π) dk

(2.1)

(2.2)

(2.3)

Consistent with other work [36, 50, 73] the TD features are also normalized (denoted with an over bar) and centered (denoted with a subscript c) and provided in
(2.4) - (2.6) where, k = 1, . . . , Nk , and the calculated means across Nk are µ(a), µ(φ),
and µ(f ) for amplitude, phase, and frequency, respectively. The function denoted by
max{·} is the maximum value of each sequence’s centered response [50].

āc (k) =

a(k) − µ(a)
,
max
k {ac (k)}

(2.4)

φ̄c (k) =

φ(k) − µ(φ)
,
max
k {φc (k)}

(2.5)

f (k) − µ(f )
f¯c (k) = max
,
k {fc (k)}

(2.6)

The selected ROI containing Nk samples is divided into NR equal subregions, such
that the number of samples per subregion is an integer. Statistical features Nstat = 4
are then generated for each of the normalized and centered instantaneous responses
Nresp = 3, where the statistical features include standard deviation (σ), variance (σ 2 ),
skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ) as depicted in Figure 2.2. It is also common practice to
utilize the entire ROI as an NR + 1 subregion. For each instantaneous, response a NRi
regional fingerprint is created according to (2.7) and concatenated as in (2.8). Then
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the individual feature vectors for a given instantaneous response are concatenated to
form the final composite fingerprint FCRF as in (2.9).
Arbitrary Feature Sequence
NR + 1
1

2

3

4

5

NR - 1

NR

fR3
σ – Std Deviation
σ2 – Variance
γ – Skewness
κ – Kurtosis

fR3 = [ σR3, σ2R3, γR3, κR3 ]
Figure 2.2. Standard RF-DNA regional fingerprint format for generating centered and
normalized feature sequences [59, 73].

FRRF
= [σRi , σR2 i , γRi , κRi ]1×4
i

RF
Fa,φ,f
= [FRRF
: FRRF
: FRRF
: · · · : FRRF
1
2
3
N

R +1

(2.7)

]1×[4(NR +1)]

FCRF = [FaRF : FφRF : FfRF ]

(2.8)

(2.9)

The number of features in a RF-DNA fingerprint are dependent on the number of
instantaneous responses Nresp , statistical features Nstat , and subregions NR selected.
For example Nresp = 3, Nstat = 3, NR = 20 results in a statistical feature vector of
length 3 × 3 × 20 = Nf eat = 180 features. The RF-DNA parameters used for this
research are covered in Section 3.6.
RF-DNA was introduced for two reasons: 1) the unintentional Ethernet
emissions are a new, previously uninvestigated emission type under the
RFINT program, and 2) to enable direct performance comparison of
prior RF-DNA and newly developed CB-DNA fingerprinting methods
utilizing identical collected emissions.
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2.3.2

Constellation-Based Fingerprinting.

This section provides background on previous CB device fingerprinting techniques.
The objective of CB fingerprinting is to take the intentional RF emissions (data
modulated ) burst responses of wireless a device and extract unique features from the
constellation responses to identify a device by its physical-layer attributes. CB device
discrimination is also affected by slight variations in components such as amplifiers,
capacitors, inductors, and oscillators used in the manufacturing devices [6,8,19,25,35].
The component variations cause deviations in symbol rate, frequency, noise, AMAM compression and AM-PM conversion as discussed in [35]. Most of the prior
work associated with using signal constellations involves extracting features from
constellation errors depicted in Figure 2.3 [6, 8, 20, 25, 35].
Q

Measured Signal

Error Vector
Ideal Signal

Measured
Phasor
Magnitude Error

Ideal Phasor

Phase Error

I

Figure 2.3. Representation of the typical errors previous constellation based fingerprinting techniques [6].

The Phase, Magnitude and Error vector presented in Figure 2.3 highlights the
main components used to create features for prior work in CB device discrimination.
A few other metrics were also mentioned and include SYNC correlation and I/Q
offset [6, 25]. Several feature extraction methods and classifiers have been looked at
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to include Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Subclass Discriminant Analysis
(SDA) in [35], Brik et al. used a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and k-Nearest
Neighbor (kNN) in [6], Maximum Likelihood (ML) and weighted voting is used in [8].
What is not evident in [6, 8, 20, 25, 35] is how the constellation statistics (mean,
variance, etc.) are compiled into feature vectors. The works generally mentioned
that features are generated based on symbol estimation errors for each symbol within
a given communication burst. It is not clear in these prior works how all the individual errors are compiled into a single feature in the radiometric signatures created [6,8,20,25,35]. The work in [6,35] does mention that an improvement in accuracy
was observed when multiple bursts were used for training. However, basic implementation details were given on training bins and the same bins did not appear to be used
for testing signatures. In [35] it states that “multiple frames are averaged to improve
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SN R)” which is different than the approach described in Section 3.10.1 where features are based on accumulation of projected points. Results
in [6, 35] are presented that do show some improvement in accuracy when increasing
the number of bursts in a training bin but again it is somewhat unclear how the
binning works.
The newly developed CB-DNA Fingerprinting method differs considerably from prior constellation-based works given it relies on symbol
cluster distributions versus simple transmitted-vs-received constellation
error metrics.
2.4

Ethernet Signaling Characteristics
The original IEEE Ethernet Standard was comprised of multiple individual stan-

dards, and as new techniques and transmission mediums were used, new standards
would be created making it difficult to keep up with changes. Therefore in 2012, all
the individual standards were placed into one Ethernet standard 802.3-2012 which
was subsequently divided into clauses [1] representing individual standards.
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Table 2.1 gives a brief comparison of three Ethernet signaling clauses in the IEEE
802.3-2012 standard. The Manchester encoding scheme is employed by the full-duplex
10BASE-T Ethernet that utilizes the clocks falling edge and data stream to encode
the transmitted data sequences [57]. The 10BASE-T clause has a symbol duration
of TSym = 100 ns and it uses serial data transmission over two Twisted Wire Pair
(TWP)’s, including one pair for transmission and one pair for receiving. For a specific
symbol interval, a Clocked Data Zero (CD0) symbol is defined as having a high voltage
level for the first half of the symbol duration and a low voltage level for the second
half. Alternately, a Clocked Data One (CD1) symbol is defined as having a low
voltage level for the first half of the symbol duration and a high voltage level for the
second half.
Table 2.1. Ethernet Comparison for Three Clauses [1].

Signaling Type

10BASE-T

100BASE-TX

100BASE-T2

Encoding

Manchester

Symbol Time

100ns

8ns

40ns

Transmission

Serial

Serial

Parallel

TWPs to Transmit

One

One

Two*

TWPs to Receive

One

One

Two*

Data Scrambler

No

Yes

Yes

Muti-Level
Pulse-Amplitude
Transmit-3 (MLT3) Modulation-5 (PAM5)

* Simultaneous Transmit and Receive on Same Wire

A network card implementing the 10BASE-T sits idle when it has no data to
send, and therefore, unintentional emissions of interest are only present when the
device is actively transmitting data frames. The preamble is used at the beginning
of each data transmission to synchronize clocks between transmitter and receiver so
that the receiver can perform symbol estimation. The preamble consists of Npre = 56
symbols that alternate between CD1 and CD0. Immediately following the preamble
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is the Start Frame Delimiter (SFD) that has a specific Nsf d = 8 symbol sequence of
‘10101011’. The SFD’s purpose is inform the receiving device that data is immediately
following. An inter-frame gap Tif g = 9.6 µs is an exploitable feature in the 10BASET standard as it provides a delay in the transmission of subsequent communication
bursts between the end of one transmission and the beginning of the next as depicted
in Figure 2.4. The implementation of the other two clauses mentioned require that
the network card is always actively transmitting data symbols; however, when no
requested data is being transmitted an idle symbol is sent instead. The other two
clauses still use the same sequence of bits for the preamble but it is no longer used
to synchronize clocks. However, the SFD is still used to indicate the start of a new
frame.
INTER-FRAME GAP

Figure 2.4. A sequence of 10BASE-T bursts highlighting the inter-frame gap between
bursts [2].

Turn-on steady-state responses of 10BASE-T communication bursts and
the inter-frame gap enables reliable burst detection and ROI extraction
for both RF-DNA and CB-DNA Fingerprinting.
2.5

MDA/ML Device Discrimination
The specific elements of MDA/ML device classification described herein are di-

rectly adopted from [15, 50] and its use is consistent with previous RF-DNA fingerprinting works [16, 17, 48–51, 59, 73, 74]. The MDA/ML process is used to generate
the classification results in Chapter IV.
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Consistent with previous device discrimination work, Device Classification is defined for this research as a 1 vs. M assessment where an unknown device fingerprint
is compared to all known devices and a decision is made as to which known device
looks “most like” the unknown device. In essence, the best match is always returned
to one of the known devices even if the input device has never been seen by the
model. The classification approach herein can be divided into two steps 1) model
development using Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) an expansion of Fisher’s
LDA from an NC = 2 class problem to an NC > 2 class problem, where NC is the
number of classes [51]. The goal of MDA is to reduced the feature dimensionality
from d dimensions to NC − 1 dimensions while maximizing the distance between class
means and minimizing the variance within a given class [23, 66], and 2) the device
classifier utilizes the ML classification technique which is accomplished by comparing
an unknown fingerprint against all class models and a measure of similarity is returned for each NC . It is then said that the unknown fingerprint belongs to the class
with the highest similarity measure because it looks the “most like” that class [15,50].

2.5.1

Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA).

The first step in MDA is to find the scatter matrices that reduces the intra-class
variance (Sw ) in (2.10) and maximizes the distant between the inter-class means (Sb )
in (2.11) [66]:
Sw =

C
X

Pi (µi − µ0 )(µi − µ0 )T ,

(2.10)

i=1

Sb =

C
X

Pi Σi ,

(2.11)

i=1

where the prior probability of class ci is Pi and Σi is the covariance matrix. Probabilities and costs are assumed to be equal for all classes. A projection matrix W is then
formed using (2.10) and (2.11) by W = Sw −1 Sb and selecting NC − 1 eigenvectors.
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Device fingerprints F are then projected into the NC − 1 dimensional space via:
FiW = WT F.

(2.12)

A projected training matrix F W is created by taking a total of NT ng training fingerprints from each class and projecting them with (2.12) as in:
F

W


T
W
W
W
= F1 , F2 , . . . , FNT ng

.

(2.13)

NT ng ×(NC −1)

A multivariate normal distribution is fitted to the projected MDA training data
for classifier development using projected class means (µ̂W
i ) and covariance matrices (Σ̂iW ). The MDA process outputs 1) projection matrix W, 2) NC sets of F W ,
W
3) NC estimated mean vectors µ̂W
i , and 4) NC covariance matrices Σ̂i . These four

outputs are then used for ML classification (estimation) of subsequent testing fingerprints F̂ [66] as described in Section 2.5.2.

2.5.2

Maximum Likelihood (ML) Classification.

This section uses the outputs from the previous section to perform ML classification via a similarity measure described by the Bayesian posterior probability and
assuming equal prior probabilities and costs. To do this, the covariance matrices Σ̂iW
are first pooled according to:
Σ̂PW

NC
X
1
=
Σ̂ W ,
NT ng − NC i=1 i

(2.14)

where NC is the total number of devices and Σ̂PW is the pooled covariance over Σ̂iW .
Device classification is then performed using some similarity criterion through a
one-to-many comparison of a single device fingerprint with a template reference from
each device modeled. A best match is found by calculating similarity score between
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an unknown projected device fingerprint F̂ and each of the NC reference models. The
unknown projected device fingerprint F̂ is then assigned to class mi according to:
P (mi |F̂) < P (mj |F̂)∀j 6= i,

(2.15)

where i = 1, 2, . . . , NC and P (mi |F̂) is the conditional posterior probability that
F̂ belongs to mi . The conditional probability is then computed according to Bayes’
Rule as in [23, 66]
P (mi |F̂) =

P (F̂|mi )P (mi )
P (F̂)

.

(2.16)

A simplification of (2.16) can occur because of the assumption of equal prior probabilities and cost (P (mi ) = 1/NC ) allow for the P (mi ) term to be ignored. The
denominator also remains constant and can likewise be ignored in (2.16) reducing
to only the P (F̂|mi ). This reduction then allows for the ML to be estimated from
likelihood values of a projected fingerprint F̂ [23,66] as in the conditional probability
1

P (F̂|mi ) =

(2π)(NC −1)/2

q
exp(Fe ),
|Σ̂PW |

(2.17)

where
1
Fe = − (F̂ − µ̂i )T (Σ̂PW )−1 (F̂ − µ̂i ).
2

(2.18)

The performance of the system is quantified by the percent correct classification
%C performance metric that is based on the number correctly identified fingerprints
divided by the total number of trials.

2.5.3

Cross-Validation.

A cross-validation mechanism can be used to improve MDA/ML reliability. This
involves: 1) dividing the training fingerprints into K equal size disjoint blocks of
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NT ng /K fingerprints, 2) holding out one block and training on K-1 blocks to produce projection matrix W as outlined in Section 2.5.1, and 3) validating the model
by using the holdout block and W to perform device classification according to Section 2.5.2 [23]. The W from the training iteration that had the highest percent
correct classification %C is output and used for subsequent MDA/ML testing assessment. The analysis of the classification errors is accomplished with the use of a
confusion matrix which will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.8.

2.6

Device ID Verification
This section provides the definition of Device ID Verification and explains the pro-

cess for device ID verification. The specific elements of device verification described
herein are adopted from [15, 50] and its use is consistent with previous RF-DNA
fingerprinting works [16, 17, 49, 59]. The device ID verification process is a 1 vs. 1
comparison for assessing “how much” a fingerprint for a claimed identity looks like
the reference model for that identity. The device verification assessment enables authentication of a device’s claimed identity via the devices fingerprint and its claimed
bit-level identity to include but not limited to Media Access Control (MAC) credentials.
For this research, there are two types of device designations that include: 1) an
authorized device presents its own (true) credentials to request network access while
its credentials are compared against a stored reference for that device, and 2) a rogue
device presents (false) credentials matching an authorized device and attempts to gain
unauthorized network access. Note that it is possible for an authorized device to turn
rogue (e.g., insider threat) and present false credentials. The purpose of verification
is to compare the claimed identity with that of the reference model for the true
identity [15]. The resultant of this comparison is a binary decision that either grants
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the device access (rightly/wrongly) or denies the device access (rightly/wrongly). The
binary decision is based solely on a verification test statistic ZV and a predetermined
threshold value tV (d) as in:

ZV ≥ tV (d) ⇒ Accept,
(2.19)
ZV < tV (d) ⇒ Reject,
where d = 1, 2, . . . , NC is the index of the reference model for the true identity.
The binary decision in (2.19) is applied to both authorized and rogue devices resulting in four possible outcomes detailed in Table 2.2 with the bold entries considered
as outcome errors.
Table 2.2. Verification Outcome Decisions with Bold Entries Denoting Errors.

Verification Decision (Output)
Authorized
Rogue

Input

Authorized Authorized Accept (AA) Authorized Reject (AR)
Rogue

Rogue Accept (RA)

Rogue Reject (RR)

The two types of errors in Table 2.2 are summarized below [15, 19, 50]:
1. An Authorized Reject (AR) from Table 2.2 is when an authorized device experiences a reject outcome from (2.19).
2. A Rogue Accept (RA) from Table 2.2 is when a rogue device experiences an
accept outcome from (2.19).
Results are typically presented as rates in terms of percentages such that:
1. True Verification Rate (T V R) is the total number of AA over all authorized
attempts (AA + AR).
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2. False Verification Rate (F V R) is the total number of AR over all authorized
attempts (AA + AR) or simply (1 − T V R).
3. Rogue Reject Rate (RRR) is the total number of RR over all rogue attempts
(RR + RA).
4. Rogue Accept Rate (RAR) is the total number of RA over all rogue attempts
(RR + RA) or simply (1 − RRR).
The verification threshold tV (d) for device d is set using a Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve which is created by plotting the T V R against F V R while
varying tV (d) as depicted in Figure 2.5. Setting the tV (d) to the same point as the
Equal Error Rate (EER) point on the curve serves two purposes: 1) the classification
system operates under equal errors such that F V R = (1 − T V R) and RAR are equal
and, 2) the EER point is a common statistic used to compare across classification
systems. The lower the EER for a given system typically indicates better performance
for that system [15, 50]. Depending on the security needs of the classification system

True Verification Rate (TVR)

the threshold value tV (d) can be increased or decreased.
1
0.8
EER

0.6

t V(A)

0.4
0.2

Device A
Device B

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

False Verification Rate (FVR)
Figure 2.5. A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for Device A and B
with diagonal dashed line representing the Equal Error Rate (EER) and highlighting
the selection of the (EER) point as the verification threshold for Device A as tV (A) .
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The ID verification steps include: 1) developing a reference model, 2) selecting
a similarity measure, 3) determining device-dependent threshold values tV (d) with,
(d = 1, 2, . . . , NC ) based on desired T V R and F V R performance, 4) generating a test
statistic ZV for each unknown fingerprint from the device presenting the claimed ID
and, 5) comparing ZV with threshold tV (d) according to (2.19) and making a final
accept (grant network access) or reject (deny network access) decision.
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III. Methodology

This chapter provides the methodology for generating results presented in Chapter IV. The experimental setup for collecting the Electromagnetic (EM) responses of
Ethernet cards using a Category 6 Ethernet cable is presented in Section 3.1. This
includes details for the collection receiver, Ethernet card operation, and EM probecable location. Section 3.3 covers post-collection processing and defines the Region of
Interest (ROI) for both Radio Frequency-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) and
Constellation Based-Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA). The details for the symbol
estimation techniques are presented in Section 3.4. Information regarding variation
in the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SN R) is covered in Section 3.5. The adopted RF-DNA
methodology and parameters used for RF-DNA fingerprint generation are covered in
Section 3.6. Section 3.7 provides details for the CB-DNA Fingerprinting approach
developed under this research and demonstrated herein. The CB-DNA development
uses the symbol projection and bit estimation using the non-conventional constellation, and generates CB-DNA fingerprints comprised of projected symbol statistics in
the new constellation space.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) implementation is introduced for device discrimination, including the Device Classification process in Section 3.8 and Device Identification (ID) Verification process in Section 3.9.
CB-DNA enhancements that demonstrate achievable device ID verification improvement are also considered and includes 1) Constellation Point Accumulation (CPA) in
Section 3.10.1, and 2) MDA/ML Projection Point Averaging (PPA) in Section 3.10.2.
Lastly, a section on additional verification metrics is included in Section 3.11 as a way
to compare this research with other works.
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3.1

Experimental Hardware Setup
The experimental hardware setup included a Dell Precision T7500 desktop com-

puter with two Network Interface Card (NIC) slots. One slot hosted the NIC used
to collect emissions of interest using a LeCroy WavePro 760Zi-A 6 GHz oscilloscope.
As will be noted in Section 3.1.1, two different, like-model, different serial number oscilloscopes were used for collections. For these collections, a low-pass baseband filter
with a bandwidth of WBB = 32 M Hz was placed in-line between the oscilloscope and
a Riscure 205HS “High Sensitivity” near-field probe to capture the EM signal. The
oscilloscope settings included: 1) a sample rate of fs = 250 MSamp/Sec (MSPS), 2) a
1.0 volts/div vertical scale, 3) a 2.0 msec/div horizontal time scale, and 4) a trigger
offset of tOf f = −25.0 ms.
The second desktop NIC slot hosted the Ethernet Devices Under Test (DUT) in
Table 3.1, i.e., the transmitting Ethernet cards to be fingerprinted. The DUTs were
connected to a Dell Precision laptop via a given length (LC ) of Category 6 Ethernet
cable and configured for 10BASE-T Ethernet signaling with full duplex enabled. As
indicated in Table 3.1, a total of 16 Ethernet cards used for proof-of-concept demonstration, including four devices (D) from each of four different manufacturers (M).
MATLAB R was used to generate transmitted DUT data, trigger the collection oscilloscope, and write/store the collected signals to disk. A communication delay
between MATLAB R and the Device Under Test (DUT) necessitated the use of a
negative collection trigger offset tOf f .
As discussed earlier in Section 2.4, 10BASE-T full duplex operation only requires
two of the four available Twisted Wire Pair (TWP)s within the Ehternet cable. This
includes a TWP wire for transmitting (TWP of interest for extracting fingerprints)
and a different TWP for receiving communications from the connect network card.
The connected network card was not actively transmitting data frames. The re31

Table 3.1. Ethernet Devices Under Test (DUT) Utilizing a Manufacturer (M) Device
(D) Combinations (M#:D#) as Device Reference.

D-Link

Intel

TRENDnET

StarTech

Dev ID MAC Dev ID MAC Dev ID MAC Dev ID MAC
M1:D1 D966 M2:D1 1586 M3:D1 9B55 M4:D1 32CB
M1:D2 DA06 M2:D2 1A93 M3:D2 9334 M4:D2 32B4
M1:D3 DA07 M2:D3 1A59 M3:D3 9B54 M4:D3 96F4
M1:D4 60E0 M2:D4 1A9E M3:D4 9B56 M4:D4 3048
maining two TWPs remained inactive during DUT emission collections. Thus, the
Ethernet communication “channel” was relatively benign with the only possible interference coming from network traffic on the receiving TWP wire. This environment
was sufficient for proof-of-concept demonstration. Performance analysis in a less benign, more fully loaded Ethernet channel (additional TWPs active), was beyond the
scope of the research and remains an area for future work.

3.1.1

Probe-Cable Orientation.

The EM collection probe could be located anywhere along the Category 6 Ethernet
cable. For a selected collection point, the probe was positioned such that it was
just touching the cable without inducing physical distortion (no pressure). Various
emission collection points and probe-cable orientations are depicted in Figure 3.1a.
Note that the probe location changes in this figure correspond to linear (along the
cable) displacement. The following points also apply for radial (around the cable)
displacement. As indicated in Figure 3.1a, at any given location along the cable
the probe is within close proximity to one of four TWPs within the cable; since the
sheath is not removed for collection, the TWP closest to the probe is unknown. Also,
as depicted in Figure 3.1b there are multiple probe-wire orientations for a given TWP.
Thus, the experimentally collected EM response (amplitude, phase, power, etc.) for
the wire of interest changes with probe position.
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(a) Ethernet Cable

(b) TWP Locations

Figure 3.1. Orientation of RF probe with respect to (a) Ethernet cable Twisted Wire
Pairs (TWP) (b) wires within a given TWP.

The TWP in Figure 3.1b includes the wire of interest with letters A, B, and C
representing three unique probe-wire positions. When the probe is at location A
the signal response is most affected by the EM field generated by the colored wire.
The same is true for the response at location C but for the white wire. In an ideal
environment, the response collected at locations A and C would be perfectly outof-phase by 180◦ . In addition, the response at location B would be zero given it
would be equidistant from both wires and the EM fields would cancel out. Thus,
establishing a repeatable procedure for probe location (axial and radial orientation)
was an important step for Ethernet cable emission collection.
A “good” probe location (linear and radial) was arbitrarily established as being
a probe-cable orientation that produced burst responses having peak amplitudes of
2-3 volts as displayed on the collection oscilloscope. For a given length cable and
collection oscilloscope combination (two combinations were used), the probe location
was determined using one of the Ethernet cards and maintained for subsequent collections from all cards using a jig to keep the probe-cable orientation fixed. The two
cable-oscilloscope collection configurations included: 1) an LC = 8 m length cable
with oscilloscope #1 (Config #1), and 2) an LC = 100 m length cable with oscilloscope #2 (Config #2). Developmental and baseline performance results in Section 4.4
and Section 4.5 are based on Config #1 using a probe location of LP ≈ 2 m from
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the transmitting DUT. Revalidation and sensitivity analysis results in Section 4.7 are
based on Config #2 using probe locations of LP ≈ 2 m (revalidation) and LP ≈ 98.0 m
(sensitivity analysis) from the transmitting DUT.

3.2

Response Analysis
This section provides the technical details for response analysis for both the wire

and Electromagnetic (EM) 10BASE-T responses. A voltage change on the wire represents the transmission of symbols in 10BASE-T Ethernet signaling. Figure 3.2a
shows an example of the measured wire response for a Clocked Data One (CD1) an
oscilloscope. As current flows along the wire an EM field is generated around the
wire and the Radio Frequency (RF) probe measures the change in the EM field to
generate an EM response for a CD1 as in Figure 3.2b.
In an ideal situation, the two subfigures in Figure 3.2 would be the derivative of
each other as given by (3.1), which represents the instantaneous current i(t) given instantaneous voltage v(t) for a single wire [67]. In (3.1) the current, i(t), is equal to the
capacitance of a single wire C times the derivative of the voltage, with respect to time.
However, Ethernet uses the TWP to reduce common mode noise, crosstalk between
adjacent wires, and the reduce the distance that RF signals can travel. The TWP
concept does not provide an ideal situation and therefore causes varying responses
based on probe placement.

i(t) = C ×
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dv(t)
dt

(3.1)
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(b) EM Response
Figure 3.2. The wired response in (a) is numerically derived from the experimentally
collected EM response in (b).

3.3

Post-Collection Processing
This section contains information specific to the processing of individual collec-

tions to extract the response Regions of Interest (ROI) used for both RF-DNA and
CB-DNA fingerprinting. The post-collection processing occurred exclusively using
MATLAB R , after emission collection described in Section 3.1. Each collection was
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approximately TCol ≈ 4.5 ms in duration and contained 25 bursts (frames). Figure
3.3 shows a typical collection with various burst durations. The space between two
ROI bursts corresponds to what is called the “inter-frame gap” which has a minimum
specified duration of Tif g = 9.6 µs. The highlighted region in Figure 3.3 is expanded
in Figure 3.4 and highlights an area containing a single ROI for both CB-DNA and
RF-DNA fingerprinting approaches. For the remainder of the document the term
“burst” will be used more widely instead of “frame” as the CB-DNA approach discussed in later sections can be expanded to other types of communication protocols;
however, “frame” will be used when specifically talking about the Ethernet.

Figure 3.3. Representative 10BASE-T EM probe response collection containing 25
bursts. Highlighted region expanded in Figure 3.4.

3.3.1

Course Burst Detection.

A course burst cb is extracted from the collected emissions as described herein.
The course burst detection process begins with an input sequence of collected samples {cs(k) : f or 1 ≤ k ≤ NCS }, where NCS is the total number of samples in
the collected sequence. Two variables are empirically set for course burst detection,
including 1) a noise level threshold VN L = 0.4 v, and 2) the number of processing window samples Npw = 800. The processing window subsequence is given by
pw({m}) ∈ {cs(k)} where m is a consecutive set of discrete samples contained in
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{cs(k)} such that m = {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , n + Npw } and 1 ≤ n ≤ NCS − Npw . The
value of Npw = 800 was empirically chosen to equal one-third the number of discrete
samples contained within the “inter-frame gap”, as defined in [1] and to ensure there
would be at least one pw({m}) having no value above NL = 0.4.
One of two outcomes is possible within processing window pw({m}):
Case A: No value in set m exists such that pw({m}) > NL = 0.4 (noise region)
Case B: > 1 value in set m exists such that pw({m}) > NL = 0.4 (burst region)
Case A and Case B conditions describe the extraction of bursts as the processing
window slides across {cs(k)} in increments of Npw until the end of the collection is
reached (NCS − Npw ). The start and end indexes for a burst within pw({m}) are
found using the following process. The burst start index is the m satisfying Case B,
when the previous processing window pw({m − Npw }) satisfies Case A. At this time,
the start index ms of the detected burst is defined as the first index in pw({m}) such
that pw(ms ) > VN L . The end of the burst is described as the pw({m}) being in Case
A when the previous pw({m−Npw }) was in Case B. At this time, the end index me of
the detected burst is the last index in pw({m}) for processing window pw({m−Npw })
such that pw(me ) > VN L . The burst is extracted according to the start ms and end
me indexes and stored for fine burst alignment.
The course burst detection process is illustrated in Figure 3.4 using the entire
highlighted region in Figure 3.3 to represent {cs(k)}. It can be seen that the noise
floor (green line) between adjacent bursts is below the VN L = 0.4 v threshold and
the red line represents a binary decision such that a 1 is represented by at least one
m ⊂ pw({m}) > VN L and a 0 represents that m 6⊂ pw({m}) > VN L . The red line
goes above and below VN L near the burst turn-on and turn-off transition boundaries
representing the start (ms ) and end (me ) indexes of the extracted cb burst. The fine
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burst alignment process in Section 3.3.2 uses the course burst detection output cb to
more precisely locate the ROI prior to RF-DNA and CB-DNA fingerprint generation.
pw(m>VNL)
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Figure 3.4. Representative {cs(k)} from Figure 3.3.

3.3.2

Fine Burst Alignment.

Fine burst alignment is an important step prior to symbol estimation, which is
covered in Section 3.4, and both RF-DNA and CB-DNA fingerprinting approaches
are covered in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7, respectively. Fine burst alignment enables
reliable symbol estimation and ROI determination for both CB-DNA and RF-DNA
fingerprinting. Fine burst alignment was accomplished here using correlation. The
implementation includes correlating the course detected burst cb response extracted
in Section 3.3.1 with a selected preamble reference response as shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5. Representative 10BASE-T preamble time domain amplitude response used
for Fine Burst Alignment (FBA) [10].
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The start of the ROI (SROI ) is defined as the sample index number where maximum correlation occurs; the same fine aligned bursts are used for generating both
RF-DNA and CB-DNA fingerprints. Fine burst alignment ensures that all ROI’s
are extracted using the same technique for all devices. The end of the ROI for
RF-DNA is Erf ROI = SROI + NDT S , where NDT S = 1600 is the number of discrete
time samples in an Ethernet preamble. The end of the ROI for CB-DNA varies from
SROI + NDT S + 14, 400 < ECBROI < SROI + NDT S + 57, 000 and is based on the length
of the transmitted burst. The number of discrete samples contained in RF-DNA is
NRF ROI = NDT S . The number of samples in a CB-DNA varies on a burst-by-burst
basis, and is defined as NCBROI = me − SROI , where me is the end of a cb defined
in Section 3.3.1. An example burst that has gone through fine burst alignment is
presented in Figure 3.6, where the ROI for both RF-DNA (RFROI ) and CB-DNA

Amplitude (v)

(CBROI ) are highlighted.
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Figure 3.6. An example Ethernet packet highlighting the Regions Of Interest (ROI)
for both RF-DNA and CB-DNA.

Fine burst alignment is not perfect and some alignment jitter remains. Jitter is
defined here as a delay/lag between SROI in cb and the first peak in the preamble of
cb , where units are number of samples. Results for the alignment jitter are covered
in Section 4.1.
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3.4

Wired Emission Symbol Estimation
This section provides development details for two symbol estimation processes:

1) the original Single Slope (SSLP) symbol estimation technique used to extract Ethernet frame data from Ethernet cable emissions [10], and 2) the expanded Constellation Based (CB) symbol estimation technique that was ultimately used for CB-DNA
process development. Proper synchronization is a must for reliable and repeatable
symbol estimation. The finely aligned bursts from Section 3.3.2 are considered adequately synchronized and ready for the symbol estimation processes.
Eye diagrams are typically used to analyze communication signal characteristics by
visualizing the time-dependent variation between multiple symbols transmitted within
a single frame [54, 76]. All eye diagrams used in this research were created after fine
burst alignment and were used to verify symbol synchronization and detect the CD1
and Clocked Data Zero (CD0) symbols. The representative eye diagram in Figure 3.7
was constructed by superimposing approximately 2,200 consecutive symbols from a
single Ethernet frame.

3.4.1

Single Slope (SSLP) Symbol Estimation.

Eye diagram analysis aided in the development of the test statistic used to perform
symbol estimation for SSLP. Visual analysis of Figure 3.7 in the highlighted TG (k)
region shows two groups of signals having amplitudes making either a negative-topositive and or positive-to-negative transition around the TG (k) midpoint; these two
groups represent CD1 (red) and CD0 (blue) symbols. There also appears to be other
symbol variants within each of the two CD1 and CD0 symbols that is revisited later
in Section 3.7.1.
The SSLP symbol estimation process for 10BASE-T binary signal reception is
described with the aid of Figure 3.8. First, consider a sequence of symbol samples
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Figure 3.7. Eye diagram from one 10BASE-T collected emission showing 100ns symbol
duration.

{s(k)} for 1 ≤ k ≤ NT S , where NT S is the total number of samples spanning symbol
interval TS in Figure 3.8. For NT S = 25 as used here, TS ≈ 100 ns as shown in (3.2),
where FSample = 250 Million Samples/sec (MSps). Elements of TG (k) are calculated
according to (3.3), where N∆ is the number of samples right and left of the midpoint
TG (km ) in Figure 3.8. The total number of elements NT G is calculated according to
(3.4). It was empirically determined through visual analysis of multiple eye diagrams
that a value N∆ = 3 provided adequate SSLP symbol estimation.
The transition of the symbols from low to high for a CD1 and high to low for a
CD0 enabled the use of the mean gradient of TG (k) as a reliable test statistic (ZG )
to estimate symbol value as in (3.5).
TS = (NT S )/FSample ≈ 100 nSec

(3.2)

TG (k) = s(k) f or (km − N∆ ≤ k ≤ km + N∆ )

(3.3)

NT G = 2 × N∆ + 1 Samples, 1 ≤ N∆ ≤ (NT S − 1)/2

(3.4)
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Figure 3.8. Near-field probe response for a Clocked Data One (CD1) symbol with
gradient test statistic TG generation region highlighted.







ZG = M ean Gradient TG (k)

(3.5)

The sign of the test statistic values determines whether a symbol is estimated as
a CD1 or CD0 according to the following threshold:
ZG > 0 → 1,
ZG ≤ 0 → 0.

3.4.2

(3.6)

Non-Conventional Constellation Development.

The 2D binary constellation described in this section is used for symbol estimation
(bit estimation) and CB-DNA fingerprinting that creates cluster statistics based on
the clusters formed during symbol projection in Section 3.7. The symbol estimation
boundary is presented and its use for symbol estimation is explained. The process
used for locating and synchronizing to individual burst responses in the collected
traces was as described in Section 3.3.2.
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Generation of the 2D constellation for 10BASE-T binary signal reception is an
expansion of the SSLP estimation process described in Section 3.4.1 and used for CB
symbol estimation in Section 3.4.3. The 2D projection process will be described with
the aid of Figure 3.9 and (3.2 - 3.4) from Section 3.4.1. The 2D projection process
starts by first considering a sequence of symbol samples {s(k)} for 1 ≤ k ≤ NT S , where
NT S is the total number of samples spanning symbol interval TS . For NT S = 25 as
used here, TS ≈ 100ns as shown in (3.2). Elements of TG (k) are calculated according
to (3.3), where N∆ is the number of samples right and left of the midpoint TG (km ).
The total number of elements NT G is calculated according to (3.4).
The difference in the symbol estimation process begins here where CB symbol
estimation uses N∆ = 7 for TG calculation which is an increase of 4 over SSLP
symbol estimation approach. The increase in N∆ was done to capture the variations
in the symbols that occur closer to the boundaries of the TS region in Figure 3.9.
Section 3.7.1 has more details about variation affects at the TS boundaries.
With the new N∆ = 7 and the sequence mid-point s(km ) at index km , two new
gradient-based test statistics are generated using two sub-sequences, {TG− (k)} and
{TG+ (k)}, on either side of s(km ) in Figure 3.9 according to (3.7) and (3.9) [11], where
each sub-sequence contains N∆ + 1 samples. MATLAB R gradient operation is used
in (3.8) and (3.10) which results in an instantaneous gradient calculation at each
sample point that calculates the slope across points (k − 1, k, k + 1) for each point
k contained in {TG− (k)} and {TG+ (k)} resulting in N∆ + 1 total slope values [43].
The resultant ZG− from (3.8) and ZG+ from (3.10) are used to form the 2D (ZG− ,ZG+ )
constellation. This is illustrated in Figure 3.10 which shows a representative received
symbol constellation for each device manufacturer. The use of these non-conventional
constellations for symbol estimation is discussed in Section 3.4.3.

43

TG
T-G

k
T+G
km
TS

Figure 3.9. Near-field probe response for a Clocked Data One (CD1) symbol with
gradient test statistic TG− (k) and TG+ (k) generation regions highlighted.

TG− (k) = s(k)f or(km − N∆ < k < km )

ZG−



 −
= M ean Gradient TG (k)

TG+ (k) = s(k)f or(km < k < km + N∆ )

ZG+

3.4.3



 +
= M ean Gradient TG (k)

(3.7)

(3.8)

(3.9)

(3.10)

Constellation-Based (CB) Symbol Estimation.

The symbol estimation in this research varies from that of traditional symbol
estimation due in part that the transmitted signal was not based on a constellation
and the derivative effect of the RF probe on the current passing through the wire. A
traditional symbol estimation method compares a projected received symbol against
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Figure 3.10. 2D binary constellation diagram, symbol estimation boundary for all card
manufacturers.

the ideal constellation points and selects the closest ideal constellation point to the
received projection to estimate its bit value. This work performs symbol estimation
on a symbol-by-symbol basis using a diagonal line denoted by ZC in Figure 3.11 which
represents the 2D binary symbol estimation boundary and is described in (3.11).
ZC → ZG− = −(ZG+ )

(3.11)

To provide symbol estimates the incoming symbols are projected into the 2D
constellation space via the (ZG− ,ZG+ ) pair from Section 3.4.2. Symbols mapped to
the left of ZC are estimated as a binary 0 while symbols mapped to right of ZC are
estimated as a binary 1.
A Bit Error Rate (BER) assessment was conducted on the CB symbol estimation
approach and compared to the SSLP approach in Section 3.4.1. The assessment
was conducted to assess the impact of BER on the CB-DNA Fingerprinting process
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Figure 3.11. 2D binary constellation diagram, symbol estimation boundary, and ideal
symbol location for card manufacturer TRENDnET (M3) [11].

in Section 3.7.3 given it relies on symbol estimates to assign projected symbols to
clusters. The results of the BER assessment are presented in Section 4.2.
3.5

Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) Variation
An important aspect of device discrimination is to perform fingerprinting as-

sessment under varying channel conditions, i.e., at varying Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SN R). Experimentally collected bursts averaged across all devices provide an SN R
of SN RC ≈ 16 dB for Config #1, SN RC ≈ 26 dB for Config #2 (LP ≈ 2 m), and
SN RC ≈ 24 dB for Config #2 (LP ≈ 98 m). The calculated SN R for all devices can
be found in Table 3.2.
To assess channel variation effects, a total of NN z = 6 independent like-filtered Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) realizations were generated and power scaled in
MATLAB R then added to the collected bursts to achieve analysis SN RA = {2x|x ∈
, 2 < x < 16} dB, (SN R is used in place of SN RA henceforth for brevity). Each
AWGN realization was 1) randomly generated from a Gaussian distribution, 2) baseband filtered with a WBB = 40 MHz and a Of ilt = 16 order filter, 3) power-scaled to
achieve the appropriate SN R value, and 4) added to the collected signal responses.
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This process was repeated for all collected signal responses NS = 1, 000 per card to
generate a total of NF = NS × NN z = 6, 000 fingerprints for model development and
device verification in Sections 3.8 and 3.9, respectively.
Table 3.2. Calculated Signal-to-Noise-Ratios (SN R) for All 16 Device Manufacturers
at Probe to Transmitter Distances of LP = 2 m and 98 m Along the Cable.

Device ID Config #1 Config #2 Config #2
LP = 2 m LP = 2 m LP = 98 m
M1:D1

15.0

26.0

23.6

M1:D2

15.1

26.0

23.4

M1:D3

14.7

26.0

23.6

M1:D4

14.9

25.7

23.4

M2:D1

19.3

24.4

24.7

M2:D2

17.6

25.1

23.7

M2:D3

19.5

24.6

24.5

M2:D4

21.7

25.2

24.5

M3:D1

14.1

25.7

23.4

M3:D2

13.4

25.6

23.4

M3:D3

18.7

25.6

19.8

M3:D4

13.5

25.4

23.8

M4:D1

13.9

25.4

24.3

M4:D2

13.8

25.6

24.5

M4:D3

13.5

25.7

24.2

M4:D4

13.3

25.6

24.0

Average

15.7

25.5

23.7

Variations in the SN R are attributed to the differences in the collection receiver,
as well as the probe-to-cable orientation.
3.6

RF-DNA Fingerprinting
This section provides the implementation of the adopted RF-DNA fingerprinting

approach discussed in Section 2.3 to include the relevant parameters associated with
fingerprint generation used during device discrimination.
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3.6.1

RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation.

The preamble of the Ethernet frame was selected as the ROI for implementation
of the RF-DNA approach as highlighted in Figure 3.6 and is subsequently expanded
in Figure 3.12 to show only the preamble response. The preamble response shown in
Figure 3.12 is RFROI , where each RFROI contains NDT S = 1600 discrete time samples
and consists of only NrSym = 64 transmitted symbols per ROI.
2.5
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0.5
0
−0.5
−1
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Subregions: 16 Total
Figure 3.12. Representative 10BASE-T Region of Interest (ROI) for RF-DNA and used
for fingerprint generation. The RFROI contains NDT S = 1600 and divided into NR = 16
subregions.

To extract a unique DNA feature set, each Time Domain (TD) ROI is divided
into NR equal length subregions as illustrated in Figure 3.12 for NR = 16, where
each NR subregion has an equal number of discrete times samples k. Instantaneous
amplitude {a(k)}, phase {φ(k)}, and frequency {f (k)} are TD sequences used for
RF-DNA fingerprint generation. Composite RF-DNA fingerprints are generated by:
1) centering (mean removal) and normalizing {a(k)}, {φ(k)}, and {f (k)}, 2) calculating three statistical features of variance (σ 2 ), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ) for each
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TD sequence to form Regional Fingerprint FRRF
as in (3.12) for i = 1, 2, . . . , NR , and
i
concatenate into an instantaneous response vector as in (3.13)and, 3) concatenate
RF
to form the final 1 × (9NR ) Composite RF-DNA
instantaneous response vectors Fa,φ,f

Fingerprint FCRF as in (3.14) [16, 17, 73].

FRRF
= [σR2 i , γRi , κRi ]1×3
i

(3.12)

RF
Fa,φ,f
= [FRRF
: FRRF
: FRRF
: · · · : FRRF
1
2
3
N

R +1

FCRF = [FaRF : FφRF : FfRF ]1×(9NR )

]1×NR

(3.13)

(3.14)

The total number of RF-DNA features in (3.14) is a function of NR , TD responses, and statistics. Varying NR provides a means to investigate performance
for various feature vector sizes. Fingerprints were generated over the ROI using
three TD responses ({a(k)}, {φ(k)}, {f (k)}), three statistics (σ 2 , γ, κ) per response, for NR = 16, 32, 80 with (3.14) and produced RF-DNA fingerprints having
NF eat = 144, 288, 720 total features, respectively. A total NN z = 6 independent
AWGN realizations were added to each of the NS = 1, 000 collected bursts as described in Section 3.5 to provide a total of NF = NS × NN z = 6, 000 fingerprints for
each device at each analysis SN Rs.

3.7

CB-DNA Development
This section provides technical details for developing a two-dimensional (2D) sig-

naling constellation from symbol projections. This development was required given
that the near-field probe response represents the time derivative of signals passing
through the Ethernet cable and no previous constellation was associated with the
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derivative signal. CB symbol estimation was covered in Section 3.4.3. Section 3.7.1
explains conditional and unconditional cluster regions within the constellation space.
The CB-DNA approach is explained in Section 3.7.2 which exploits the subcluster
(conditional ) and aggregate (unconditional ) regions for fingerprint generation in Section 3.7.3.

3.7.1

Constellation Cluster Analysis.

The 10BASE-T Ethernet Standard 802.3, Clause 14 states that only two symbols
are used to transmit a data one and zero. However, Section 3.4.1 postulated that the
Ethernet cable emissions collected by the RF probe contained multiple variations of
those symbols based on the appearance of the eye diagram in Figure 3.7. The symbol
projection process developed in Section 3.4.2 further supports the idea of subclusters in the constellations presented in Figure 3.10 because cluster regions are easily
identifiable within the aggregate clusters of ones and zeros. For example, Figure 3.10
shows that the Intel constellation has six distinct groupings, with three on each side
of ZC .
To highlight the symbol variants responsible for the subclusters within a projected constellation, each symbol variant is separated by their demodulation value
and grouped based on preceding and succeeding symbol estimations. As a result,
four symbol shapes emerge that represent an estimated CD1 and four that represent
an estimated CD0 for a total of eight distinct symbol shapes. Figure 3.13 displays the
eight symbols for two manufacturers. When referring to the subplots in Figure 3.13 a
quadrant system is used. The upper left quadrant is referred to as quadrant one and
the quadrants are increased numerically in a clockwise rotation until the quadrant 4
(lower left) is reached. For both card manufacturers the symbols in quadrants one
and two represent an estimated symbol value of a one and in quadrants three and
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four an estimated symbol value of a zero. Quadrants two and three have a preceding
estimated symbol of a one, and quadrants one and four have a preceding estimated
symbol of a zero. In Figure 3.13, a succeeding estimated symbol of a one is represented
by a solid line in all quadrants, whereas a zero is a dashed line. Each symbol was
generated by averaging Nsym = 200 symbols for each of the eight bit combinations,
[000], [001], [100], [101], [111], [110], [011], [010]. A quadrant by quadrant comparison
between, Figure 3.13a and Figure 3.13b shows that symbol shapes are similar near
the midpoint of the symbols between the card manufacturers. However, slight variations can be seen in the amplitude and signal behavior at the left edge of TG− and
right edge of TG+ regions denoted as green dashed lines.
With the new information gained through cluster analysis a new color constellation
was created by plotting each of the eight symbols with a different (symbol/color)
combination to highlight the effect of preceding and succeeding bit combinations on
constellation shapes. The new constellation is displayed in Figure 3.14 where it is
apparent that independent aggregate clusters in Figure 3.11 are made up of four
dependent subcluster regions.
Figure 3.14 displays eight distinct conditional subcluster regions for StarTech
(M3:D1). The two legends denote the bit combinations used to assign projected
symbols to a given subcluster. Middle bit values represent the current bit being
estimated. For example, the red open circles are estimated to be a zero and the
estimated bit before and after the current bit are also estimated as a zero. The
dependent subcluster regions are also provided for the remainder of the four manufacturers in Figure 3.15 where it is visually evident that Intel (M2) and StarTech (M4)
constellations are discernibly different than DLink (M1) and TRENDnET (M3). In
Figure 3.15 it is also apparent that M1 and M3 are the most similar and would be
difficult to tell apart visually. It is these variations in subcluster sizes and locations
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(b) M2:D1
Figure 3.13. Averaged symbol shapes presented for card manufacturer M1 (a) and M2
(b) with each symbol representing an average of Nsym = 200 symbols. The dashed yellow
vertical line is the symbol midpoint km and the dashed green vertical lines represent
the boundaries of TG from Figure 3.9.

that the CB-DNA fingerprinting approach capitalizes on when creating a fingerprint
feature set.

3.7.2

CB-DNA Fingerprinting Approach.

As with the RF-DNA fingerprinting approach, a majority of prior constellationbased fingerprinting works rely on features extracted from intentional RF emissions.
However, unlike RF-DNA approaches that extract relevant features prior to symbol
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Figure 3.14. 2D binary constellation diagram, symbol estimation boundary and subcluster regions for card manufacturer StarTech (M3).
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Figure 3.15. 2D binary constellation diagram, symbol estimation boundary and subcluster regions for all card manufacturers.
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constellation mapping, the constellation-based methods rely on this mapping and extract unique features derived from modulation errors within the constellation space,
i.e., differences (error) between received projected symbol points and ideal transmitted
constellation points [6, 20, 25, 35]. The CB-DNA approach developed here also relies
on projected symbol mapping, but differs from previous approaches by extracting
statistical features from projected symbols grouped as: 1) Unconditional aggregated
clusters, and 2) Conditional subclusters comprising the aggregated cluster. The aggregated clusters are qualified as unconditional given that projection assignment to
these clusters is independent of prior and subsequent symbol projections (bit values)
given that only a single communication symbol within the burst is required for assignment. The subcluster regions are qualified as conditional given that projection
assignment to subclusters is dependent on both the prior and subsequent symbol projections (bit values prior to and succeeding the current bit to be estimated) three
consecutive communication symbols within a burst are required for assignment.
The entire Ethernet communication burst is used as the ROI for the CB-DNA
fingerprinting approach as highlighted in Figure 3.6. Given the variable payload of
Ethernet transmissions, the number of communication symbols available in each burst
used for CB-DNA fingerprint generation ranges from Nsym = 576 to Nsym = 2, 280
including the preamble symbols. As such, each subcluster region averages between
72 and 285 projected symbols. When compared to the RF-DNA ROI which only
includes the preamble response Nsym = 64, the CB-DNA ROI provides 9 to 33 times
more symbols to generate fingerprint statistics.
Unique CB-DNA feature sets are extracted from the burst ROI using the following
steps on a burst-by-burst basis: 1) individual communication symbols within the
burst are projected into the constellation space described in Section 3.4.3, 2) resultant
(ZG− , ZG+ ) pairs are placed in one of eight groups based on three consecutive symbol
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projections, i.e., [0 X 0], [0 X 1], [1 X 0], and [1 X 1], where X denotes the symbol being
currently projected, 3) statistical features of mean (µ), variance (σ 2 ), skewness (γ),
kurtosis (κ), covariance (Cov), coskewness (β1×2 ), and cokurtosis (δ1×3 ) are calculated
for the two unconditional aggregated and eight conditional subcluster regions, and
4) fingerprints sets are formed according to the Section 3.7.3.
3.7.3

CB-DNA Fingerprint Generation.

Calculation of statistical CB-DNA fingerprint features originate within designated
aggregate and subcluster regions of the constellation described in Section 3.7.1 for a
total of NCR = 2 + 8 = 10. Statistical CB-DNA features are then calculated for each
cluster region using the mean (µ), variance (σ 2 ), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ) along
the ZG− and ZG+ dimensions shown in Figure 3.14. Joint statistics in both the ZG− and
ZG+ direction are also considered and include covariance (cov), coskewness (β1×2 ), and
cokurtosis (δ1×3 ). The resultant statistics form a Regional Cluster Fingerprint FRCB
i
given by (3.15), where the superscripted −/+ sign denotes constellation dimension
and i = 1, 2, . . . , NCR . The final Composite CB-DNA Fingerprint FCCB is of dimension 1 × (14 × NCR ) and constructed by concatenating FRCB
from (3.15) as shown in
i
(3.16) [11].
 − + 2− 2+ − + − +
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1
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3
N
1×(14N
CR

CR )

(3.15)

(3.16)

The total number of CB-DNA features in (3.16) is a function of NCR , statistics, and dimensions i.e., ZG− and ZG+ . Varying NCR provides a means to investigate performance for various feature vector sizes. Fingerprints were generated using
NCR = 2, 8, 10, with 4 statistics (µ, σ 2 , γ, κ) from each of the ZG− and ZG+ dimen55

sions and 6 joint statistics (cov, β1×2 , δ1×3 ) producing CB-DNA fingerprints having
NF eat = 28, 112, 140 total features, respectively. A total NN z = 6 independent, likefiltered AWGN realizations were added to each of the NS = 1, 000 collected bursts as
described in Section 3.5. This yields a total of NF = NS × NN z = 6, 000 fingerprints
per device for each analysis SN R.

3.8

Device Classification
This section describes the specific implementation of MDA/ML processing in Sec-

tion 2.5 that was used to generate results in Chapter IV. The general term class
is used to describe either a group of network devices from a specific manufacturer
(manufacturer class) or an individual network card (device class). Cross-Model Discrimination (CMD) is used herein to mean discrimination of classes representing devices from different manufacturers. Like-Model Discrimination (LMD) is used herein
to mean discrimination of classes representing devices from the same or different
manufacturers, of the same model number, and differing only in serial number.
Device classification represents a “1 vs. M” assessment where fingerprints from an
unknown device (one authorized or rogue device) are compared against fingerprints
from all known authorized devices (the many) and a decision made that assigns an
identity (rightly or wrongly) to the unknown device matching one of the authorized devices. This is a “best match” assessment that can yield both good and poor matches.
The effect of varying SN R on discrimination performance was assessed to characterize the effect of varying channel conditions and to provide an assessment of the
relationship between collection probe placement and Ethernet card separation distance. This was accomplished by adding independent like-filtered Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) NN z realizations to each experimentally collected emission
as outlined in Section 3.5. For Monte Carlo simulation results in Chapter IV, a total of
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NN z = 6 independent AWGN realizations were used to generate fingerprints across the
desired SN RA = {2x|x ∈, 2 < x < 16} dB. Given NN z = 6 AWGN realizations and
NS = 1, 000 collected signal responses per card, a total of NF = NS ×NN z = 6, 000 independent fingerprints per card were used for discrimination assessment at each SN R.
The adopted MDA/ML processing approach used here is from [50] and used to
compare RF-DNA and CB-DNA device classification performance. Both CMD and
LMD is considered using NC = 4 and NC = 16 classes, respectively. An identical
number of Training (NT ng ) and Testing (NT st ) fingerprints are used for each class.
A total of NF = 24, 000 (CMD) and NF = 6, 000 (LMD) fingerprints were generated at each SN R for each NC per Section 3.6.1 for RF-DNA and Section 3.7.3
for CB-DNA. Classifier cross-validation is implemented using a factor of K = 5 to
improve MDA/ML reliability.
Plots of average cross-class percent correct (%C) versus analysis SN R and raw
classification confusion matrices are used in Section 4.4 to quantify classification performance. This provides an accurate picture of overall performance for the classification model across all SN R explored. The confusion matrices are used to assess
performance at a specific SN R and to highlight correct and incorrect cross-class performance that is not evident in %C plots. The confusion matrix representations used
here are consistent with literature [27, 28], with 1) correct classification reflected in
diagonal entries, and 2) misclassification reflected in off-diagonal entries, i.e., how one
class is confused with another class in the model.

3.9

Device ID Verification
This section provides the specific implementation for device verification as outlined

in Section 2.6 and is used to generate the verification results in Chapter IV. The
Euclidean distance metric is chosen as the measure of similarity for device verification.
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The development of the reference model/models is the first step in verification as
outlined in Section 2.6 which involves selecting rogue devices from the pool of available
devices from Table 3.1 to hold out during MDA/ML model development. To keep
the model of authorized devices as robust as possible the original set of NC = 16
was divided into two disjoint sets representing NA(i) = 12 authorized devices and
NR(i) = 4 rogue devices where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., NP erm denotes permutation number. For
each permutation, the NR(i) rogue set contains 1-of-4 devices from each manufacturer
and are selected as four-choose-one on a per manufacturer basis, yielding a total of
NP erm = 256 possible rogue permutations sets. Accordingly, the NA(i) authorized
sets contain the remaining 3-of-4 devices from each manufacturer. Table 3.3 provides
ten representative permutations where, X∈NA(i) and {R1, R2, R3, R4} ∈ NR(i) . For
each permutation, all NR(i) = 4 rogues present false credentials matching each of
the NA(i) = 12 authorized devices, for a total of 4 × 12 = 48 rogue scenarios per
permutation. Accounting for NA(i) = 12 authorized devices and NP erm = 256 rogue
permutations of NR(i) = 4 rogue devices provides a total of 12 × 256 × 4 = 12, 288
possible rogue assessment scenarios.
Providing results for all NP erm = 256 permutations would be tedious; therefore, a
reduced number of results will be presented in Chapter IV. The process for selecting
the limited number of permutations discussed in Section 4.5 is based on the examination of the %C for all NP erm = 256 authorized permutations. All NP erm = 256
MDA/ML permutations were generated with CB-DNA and RF-DNA approaches and
a visual inspection of Figure 3.16 shows no apparent outliers but instead shows a periodic trend is evident in %C for each SN R over all NP erm = 256 permutations.
Per the legend in Figure 3.17, %C results for three specific SN R are highlighted
with periodic behavior attributed to how devices were assigned to each permutation.
With no apparent visual outliers in Figure 3.16a, the lowest and highest %C for
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Figure 3.16. LMD average %C for 256 permutations (i=1, 2,. . . , 256) with NA(i) =12
devices chosen as 3 devices from each of 4 manufacturers. All SN R ranges are plotted
with specific SNRs highlighted according to Figure 3.17.

Figure 3.17. Legend for Figure 3.16.
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Table 3.3. Manufacturer-Device (M:D) Combinations Used for Verification Assessments. Shows 10 of 256 Permutations with X Denoting NA(i) = 12 (i = 29, 32, 74, 105,
106, 107, 108, 157, 159 and 160) Authorized Devices and 4 Rogue Devices {R1, R2,
R3, R4} [?].

Reference

MAC Address
Perm (i )
Last Four
29 32 74 105 106 107 108 157 159 160

M1:D1
M1:D2
M1:D3
M1:D4

D966
DA06
DA07
60E0

R1
X
X
X

R1
X
X
X

X
R1
X
X

X X X X X X X
R1 R1 R1 R1 X X X
X X X X R1 R1 R1
X X X X X X X

M2:D1
M2:D2
M2:D3
M2:D4

1586
1A93
1A59
1A9E

X
R2
X
X

X
R2
X
X

R2
X
X
X

X X X X X X X
X X X X R2 R2 R2
R2 R2 R2 R2 X X X
X X X X X X X

M3:D1
M3:D2
M3:D3
M3:D4

9B55
9334
9B54
9B56

X
X
X
R3

X
X
X
R3

X
X
R3
X

X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
R3 R3 X X X X X
X X R3 R3 R3 R3 R3

M4:D1
M4:D2
M4:D3
M4:D4

32CB
32B4
96F4
3048

R4
X
X
X

X
X
X
R4

X
R4
X
X

R4 X X X R4 X X
X R4 X X X X X
X X R4 X X R4 X
X X X R4 X X R4

each SN R are taken from Figure 3.16a and provided in Figure 3.18 for comparison.
Again no visual outliers are present and the expected relationship of increasing %C
with increasing SN R is evident. Therefore, a representative set of NA(i) permutations
in Table 3.3 were chosen for presentation given they are statistically representative of
highest (i = 29, 32, 157, 159, 160) and lowest (i = 74, 105, 106, 107, 108) %C. These
permutations are subsequently used for rogue assessment in Section 4.5 at an analysis
SN R = 20 dB that corresponds to the first time that %C > 90% in Figure 3.18.
Verification results presented in Section 4.5 are based on Table 3.3, which provides
ten representative permutations for, X∈ NA(i) and {R1, R2, R3, R4} ∈ NR(i) , where
(i = 29, 32, 74, 105, 106, 107, 108, 157, 159, 160). For each permutation, all NR(i) = 4
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Figure 3.18. Highest and lowest %C performance across all permutations in Figure 3.16
at each SNR considered.

rogue devices present false credentials matching each of the NA(i) = 12 authorized
devices, for a total of 4 × 12 = 48 rogue scenarios per permutation.

3.9.1

Authorized Device Assessments.

Test statistics ZV are calculated for authorized devices from NT ng = 3, 000 and
NT st = 3, 000 fingerprints to assess the ability for an authorized device to correctly
gain access to the network. The test statistics are used to generate the authorized
device Probability Mass Functions (PMF) for the training and testing sets. The
generated PMFs are then used to create the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves which provide a measure of system performance as outlined in Section 2.6. An
example ROC curve is displayed in Figure 3.19 and is used to set device dependent
threshold values, tV (d) for d = 1, 2, . . . , NA(i) , which are set here at the Equal Error
Rate (EER) for consistency with other related research.
The assessment criteria for an authorized device is based on True Verification Rate
(T V R) and False Verification Rate (F V R) such that T V R > 0.9 and F V R < 0.1,
which results in a Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) access decision with respect to the
authorized ROC curves. Solid lines in the authorized device ROC curves have suc-
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False Verification Rate (FVR)
Figure 3.19. A general Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve with horizontal
dashed lined representing the 90 % benchmark and solid (Grant) and dashed (Deny)
curves represent the Binary Grant/Deny (BDG) access decision.

cessfully met the BGD criteria and gained access to the network while dashed lines
represent those that do not. The Authorized Accept Rate (AAR) is a metric that
measures all the BGD decisions for a given permutation. When AAR = 100% for a
given permutation, all NA = 12 devices have successfully gained access to the network.
Figure 3.20 displays an alternative way to look at a ROC curve by plotting the
individual test statistics that make up the PMFs from which the ROC curves are generated. In Figure 3.20 the blue circles represent an authorized device being correctly
granted access to the network and the red X’s denote when the authorized device
was incorrectly denied access to the network. Each test statistic is representative
of a single burst attempt at network access and thereby results will be presented as
Burst-by-Burst (BbB). The horizontal black lines represent the threshold value tV (d)
at the EER for each authorized device A1 . . . A12 from Figure 3.19.
BbB attempts are reported using an T V R metric. The BbB metrics are based
on NA = 12 authorized devices with each attempting NT st = 3, 000 network access
attempts. This results in Naa = 3, 000 access attempts for each device and when
T V R = 100% that device was correctly granted access for all Naa access attempts.
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Figure 3.20. Individual euclidean distance test statistics. Solid horizontal lines are device dependent tV (d) thresholds corresponding to ROC EER in Figure 3.19. Authorized
devices are listed as (A1–A12). Individual ID verification test statistics are represented
by either blue circles correctly granted access or red X’s incorrectly denying access.

3.9.2

Rogue Device Assessments.

Rogue assessment results in Section 4.5 are based NT st = 6, 000 rogue testing
fingerprints being compared against each of the NA = 12 authorized devices, for a
total of ZV = 6, 000 × 12 = 72, 000 test statistics per rogue device for a given rogue
assessment. With each permutation having NR = 4 rogue devices, the resultant
number of test statics calculated per permutation considered is N ZV = 288, 000.
The assessment criteria for rogue devices is based on T V R and Rogue Rejection
Rate (RAR) such that T V R > 0.9 and RAR < 0.1 which also results in a BGD access
decision with respect to the rogue ROC curves. Solid lines in rogue device ROC curves
are denied access to the network by because they met the rogue BGD criteria, while
dashed lines represent those that have been erroneously granted access. The Rogue
Rejection Rate (RRR) (RRR = 1 − RAR) is a metric that measures all the BGD
decisions for a given permutation. When RRR = 100% for a given permutation, then
all NA = 12 × NR = 4 = 48 rogue access attempts have been successfully denied
access to the network.
BbB attempts are also reported using an RRR metric. The BbB metrics are
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based on NR = 4 rogue devices with each attempting NT st = 6, 000 network access
attempts as each of the NA = 12 authorized devices. The resultant number of access
attempts is Naa = 4 × 6, 000 × 12 = 288, 000. When RRR = 100, all Naa = 288, 000
access attempts were correctly denied network access. A similar BbB figure will be
used for RRR comparisons as was used for T V R of authorized devices.

3.10

Device ID Verification Enhancements

This sections provides two enhancements called CPA and PPA to improve the
performance of device ID verification. Figure 3.21 represents the general process for
each of the enhancements. CPA is covered in Section 3.10.1 and PPA in Section 3.10.2.

Figure 3.21. Device ID verification improvement methodology, including: 1) Constellation Point Accumulation (CPA) for CB-DNA, and 2) MDA/ML Projection Point
Averaging (PPA) for both RF-DNA and CB-DNA.

3.10.1

Constellation Point Accumulation (CPA).

This section provides an explanation of CPA. Two figures are presented to provide
an example of CPA effects on NCR regions, 3) The CPA process and fingerprint
64

generation based on the increased size of NCR regions is explained.
Constellation point accumulation is accomplished prior to fingerprint generation
and is used to increase the number of projected symbols per NCR region. The idea for
this enhanced process is that the more points included in the calculation of statistical
features discussed in Section 3.7.3 would provide more veritable fingerprint features
and thus increase device discrimination performance.
An example of the effects of CPA on constellation shape and density is provided
in Figure 3.22 where it is clearly evident that the number of symbol projections have
increased in Figure 3.22b from Figure 3.22a.

65

Z+

G

5

0

-5
-5

0

5

ZG

(a) NCP A = 1

Z +G

5

0

-5
-5

0

5

Z -G

(b) NCP A = 9
Figure 3.22. The effects of Constellation Point Accumulation (CPA) on cluster regions
for device M4:D1 (StarTech).

The process of CPA takes multiple bursts NB (i), (i = 1, . . . , NCP A ) and divides
each NB (i) into their respective NCR (i, j), (j = 1, 2, . . . , 10) cluster regions as outlined
in Section 3.7.1 and Section 3.7.2. The NCR (i, j) regions are then merged over i to
form larger M NCR (j) subcluster regions as outlined in (3.17).
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M NCR (1),

M NCR (2),

...

, M NCR (10)

The newly formed M NCR (j) regions in (3.17) are then processed in the same
manner as outlined in Section 3.7.3 and are used for fingerprint generation in the
same manner as NCR cluster regions for a single burst. Results were generated and
are available for NCP A = 1, 3, 6, 9; however, only results for NCP A = 1 and NCP A = 9
are discussed in Section 4.6.

3.10.2

Projection Point Averaging (PPA).

This section provides details on PPA as a second enhancement to the CB-DNA
approach to provide increased performance for device discrimination, if needed. This
method was previously considered in the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
RFINT program and used here as a comparison to CPA.
The timing of PPA varies from that of CPA in that PPA takes place after the
model has been developed according to Section 2.5 and occurs during the verification
process. More specifically, PPA is accomplished during the verification process after
the NT st = 3, 000 fingerprints have been projected into the Fisher space and converted
to Pj projected testing fingerprints, where j = 1, 2, . . . , NT st . The set of {Pj }’s
are then averaged according to the value of NP P A , where sum(Pj...j+NP P A −1 )/NP P A ,
results in a total number of PAve (i), where (i = 1, 2, . . . , NT st /NP P A ). The Euclidean
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similarity measure is then applied to each of the averaged projections PAve (i) and
verification for authorized and rogue devices continues as outlined in Section 2.6.
The results presented in Section 4.6 are based on NP P A = 1 and NP P A = 5.

3.11

Additional Verification Metrics

This section provides the relationship between metrics defined in Section 2.6 and
used in Chapter IV and similar metrics used in [27, 28]. Work in [27, 28] uses a
correlation based approach to exploit 10BASE-T Ethernet preambles and is most
closely related to the research presented herein. The main difference in the approaches
is that, here, CB-DNA discrimination is based on signal constellation features versus
waveform correlation features. Additionally, direct access to network cards is required
for the process in [27,28], whereas the CB-DNA approach developed here only requires
access to the Ethernet cable. The metrics used for assessments in [27, 28] include
Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and Specificity as described in [38]. Some of these metrics
were highlighted as being of interest during peer reviews of this work. Thus, the
additional metrics are summarized here for completeness and may aid readers who
are unfamiliar with metrics commonly used in AFITs published RF-DNA works and
adopted herein. The alternate metrics are based on the following type of network
access attempts: 1) the total number of network access attempts by an authorized
device results in either an Authorized Accept (AA) or Authorized Reject (AR), and
2) the total number of network access attempts by a rogue device results in either
a Rogue Reject (RR), Rogue Accept (RA). For example, if authorized Device A
attempted access to the network 25 times for a given period and it received a AA = 20
then the resultant AR = 5 over the same period. Similarly, if unauthorized Device B
attempted to access to the network 25 times for a given period and received RA = 5
then the resultant RR = 20 over the same period.
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Accuracy is defined in (3.18) with Accuracy = 1 for a particular device being
desired and reflecting that 1) the device’s AR = 0, and 2) no rogues were accepted
using its credentials resulting in RA = 0.
Precision is defined in (3.19) and provides insight into how easily an authorized
device’s identity can be stolen and how often it is denied access. When P recision = 1
for a given device, AR = 0 (it is always granted access) however, the value of RR is
unknown as (3.19) reduces to RR/RR = 1. When P recision = 0 device credentials
are easily stolen and we have no insight into false verifications because the numerator
is zero.
Recall is defined in (3.20) and is equivalent to what is calculated as RRR in
Section 3.9.2. This metric characterizes the vulnerability for a given device to have
its credentials stolen. When Recall = 1 for a given authorized device then any other
unauthorized device trying to gain access as that authorized device is rejected such
that RA = 0.
Specificity is defined in (3.21) and is equivalent to what is calculated as T V R in
this work. This metric characterizes a particular devices ability to gain authorized
network access as itself. For a device with Specif icity = 1 it is always correctly
granted network access.
Accuracy =

RR + AA
[(RA + RR) + (AA + AR)]

(3.18)

RR
(RR + AR)

(3.19)

P recision =

Recall =

RR
(RA + RR)

Specif icity =
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AA
(AA + AR)

(3.20)

(3.21)

Consistent with prior related RF-DNA works, RRR (Recall ) and T V R (Specificity)
are predominantly used here for verification performance assessments in Chapter 4.
Given refereed paper feedback which suggest that Accuracy is the most “telling of
the four additional metrics, Accuracy metrics are given some attention as well in
Section 4.5.1 to assess CB-DNA device ID verification performance.
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IV. Results

This chapter starts by providing some analysis results for the alignment jitter
in Section 4.1, the Bit Error Rate (BER) assessment in Section 4.2, and the device
chip-set analysis in Section 4.3, which are used to explain some of the classification
and verification results in the latter sections. Results are then presented for Device Classification and Device ID Verification using Radio Frequency-Distinct Native
Attribute (RF-DNA) and Constellation Based-Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA)
device fingerprinting techniques based on the methodology described in Chapter III.
The RF-DNA results were generated using a process adopted from previous related
work [16, 51, 73] and implemented as described in Section 3.6. The CB-DNA results
were generated using the process developed under this research and described in Section 3.7. Furthermore, comparative results are presented for RF-DNA and CB-DNA
fingerprinting techniques using device fingerprints generated from the same collected
emissions as described in Chapter III. The Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) results for Device Classification are based on a 1 vs. M
“Looks Most Like?” assessment and are presented in Section 4.4 for both NC = 4 and
NC = 16 authorized device class models. Results for Device ID Verification are based
on 1 vs. 1 “Looks How Much Like?” assessment and are presented in Section 4.5 for
NC = 12 Authorized device class models and NR = 4 Rogue devices as described in
Section 3.9. Preliminary results for process enhancements are provided in Section 4.6
and demonstrate achievable improvement resulting from cross-burst 1) Constellation
Point Accumulation (CPA), and 2) MDA/ML Projection Point Averaging (PPA).
Lastly, a sensitivity analysis and probe placement comparison is accomplished in
Section 4.7 by moving the probe-to-card location from LP ≈ 2 m to LP ≈ 98 m.
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4.1

Burst Alignment Jitter
This section discusses the alignment jitter for all devices for both Config #1

(oscope #1, cable #1 of length LC = 8 m) and Config #2 (oscope #2, cable #2 of
length LC = 100 m). The alignment jitter Aj is defined as the number of samples
between the max correlation point and the first peak in the preamble.
Table 4.1 shows the standard deviation on the number of samples between the SROI
and the first peak in the alignment process. For the Config #1 listed in Table 4.1,
relatively the same amount of jitter is present for all devices except M3:D3 from
manufacturer TRENDnET. Config #2 with LP ≈ 2 m shows that the standard
deviations are fairly consistent across all devices. When the collection probe is moved
to the LP ≈ 98 m location in Config #2 the fine alignment jitter Aj varies considerably
as seen in Table 4.1 with M3:D3 having the highest standard deviation.
The misalignment for device M3:D3 (Config #1) is explained with the help of
Figure 4.1 where three signals are present to include: 1) the red dashed line (reference
preamble), 2) the solid brown signal (M3:D2), and 3) the solid black signal (M3:D3).
The SROI is denoted with a dashed vertical green line at index 1. The measured
alignment jitter for device M3:D2 is shown with the aid of the brown double arrow
which extends from the SROI to the vertical dashed brown line which represents the
first maximum value of the aligned signal with Aj = 3. The measured alignment
jitter for device M3:D3 is shown with the black double arrow which extends to the
dashed black line representing the first maximum value of that aligned signal with
Aj = 21. This phenomenon was discussed earlier in Section 3.1.1 and is caused
by how signals are transmitted over the twisted pair. The effects of the alignment
jitter Aj have a varying net positive effect on device classification for both RF-DNA
and CB-DNA. As the NR subregions for RF-DNA are increased, more features will
be based on the misaligned subregion making it easier for MDA/ML to exploit the
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Table 4.1. The Standard Deviation Associated with Fine Burst Alignment Between
the Start of the ROI and the First Peak in the Aligned ROI.

Device ID Config #1 Config #2 Config #2
LP = 2 m LP = 2 m LP = 98 m
M1:D1

1.2

1.2

42

M1:D2

1.2

1.2

56

M1:D3

1.2

1.2

52

M1:D4

1.2

1.2

49

M2:D1

1.4

1.3

28

M2:D2

1.5

1.3

64

M2:D3

1.5

1.3

23

M2:D4

1.6

1.3

65

M3:D1

1.2

1.2

69

M3:D2

1.2

1.2

75

M3:D3

10.6

1.2

698

M3:D4

1.2

1.2

35

M4:D1

1.1

1.1

117

M4:D2

1.1

1.1

108

M4:D3

1.1

1.1

125

M4:D4

1.1

1.1
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Figure 4.1. Illustration of alignment jitter showing how the maximum correlation point
occurs before the ROI start.
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affected statistics. The CB-DNA approach only has one projected symbol adversely
affected by the misalignment resulting in a smaller net effect to CB-DNA fingerprints.
Because of this disparity, RF-DNA has an advantage over CB-DNA for both Device
Classification and Device ID Verification.

4.2

BER Assessment
The BER assessment provided in this section is based on Nsym ≈ 1.7 billion

collected symbols per manufacturer (pooled symbols from 4 cards). The BER results
are presented in Table 4.2 where the Single Slope (SSLP) results were generated
according to Section 3.4.1 [10] and Constellation Based (CB) results were generated
according to Section 3.4.3 [11]. The overall BER for each method is approximately
the same and on average experiences one bit error for every 1.34 M symbol estimates.
The maximum size burst sent has N Bmax = 2280 symbols and only one out of every
587 generated fingerprints would be affected on average based on current BER. One
bit error would affect the proper placement of three points into the proper subcluster
grouping. It is determined that this small error rate will have a negligible effect
on CB-DNA fingerprint generation. The effects of an increased BER on fingerprint
statistics is left for future work.
Table 4.2. Comparison of Card Manufacturer BER for Previous Single Slope (SSLP)
Estimation Method in [10] and the 2D Constellation Point (CP) Method [11].

Manufacturer

# Processed Bits # Bit Errors
in Billions
SSLP CB

BER
SSLP
CB

D-Link (M1)

1,733

21

18

1.21E-08 1.04E-08

Intel (M2)

1,739

845

845

4.86E-07 4.86E-07

TRENDnET (M3)

1,740

8

389

4.59E-09 2.23E-07

StarTech (M4)

1,737

1260

3478

7.25E-07 2.00E-06

Totals

6,949

2971

5186 4.28E-07 7.46E-07
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4.3

Device Chip-set Analysis
The chip-sets for the NC = 16 Device Under Test (DUT)s that were used in this

research were examined for similarities in the specific components used to manufacture
these devices. The four different manufacturers were used with four devices from each
manufacturer; the results of the chip-set visual examination are provided in Table 4.3.
It is evident from this table that M1 and M3 devices have the same LAN transformer
markings. The LAN transformer is the last component that conditions the signal
prior to it being transferred to the PHY medium. The effects of the common LAN
transformer markings will be discussed as needed in the future sections.
Table 4.3. An Expansion of Table 3.1 to Highlight the Chip-Set Markings for the 16
Devices Under Test (DUT)s [11, 12].

Manufacturer Reference MAC Address
Last Four

LAN Transformer Markings

D-Link

M1:D1
M1:D2
M1:D3
M1:D4

D966
DA06
DA07
60E0

Bi-Tek
Bi-Tek
Bi-Tek
Bi-Tek

IM-1178LLF
IM-1178LLF
IM-1178LLF
IM-1178LLF

1247I
1247I
1247I
1247I

Intel

M2:D1
M2:D2
M2:D3
M2:D4

1586
1A93
1A59
1A9E

BI
BI
BI
BI

HS00-06037LF
HS00-06037LF
HS00-06037LF
HS00-06037LF

1247
1247
1247
1247

TRENDnET

M3:D1
M3:D2
M3:D3
M3:D4

9B55
9334
9B54
9B56

Bi-Tek
Bi-Tek
Bi-Tek
Bi-Tek

IM-1178LLF
IM-1178LLF
IM-1178LLF
IM-1178LLF

1247I
1247I
1247I
1247I

StarTech

M4:D1
M4:D2
M4:D3
M4:D4

32CB
32B4
96F4
3048

FPE
FPE
FPE
FPE

G24102MK
G24102MK
G24102MK
G24102MK

1250a1
1250a1
1320G1
1250a1
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4.4

Device Classification
This section provides results for the 1 vs. M “Looks Most Like?” classification

assessment. For the remainder of the document, comparison is aided by presenting
CB-DNA results to the left of, or above, RF-DNA results.
Classification results are based on the MDA/ML process outlined in Section 3.8,
where classification represents a comparison between one device versus many (specifically, 1 vs. M). MDA/ML results are presented here for both Cross-Model Discrimination (CMD) and Like-Model Discrimination (LMD) (serial number discrimination)
using the NC = 16 devices listed in Table 3.1. Device fingerprint generation occurs using identical burst emissions per methods in Section 3.6 for RF-DNA and Section 3.7
for CB-DNA, with RF-DNA using only the burst preamble and CB-DNA using the
entire burst response.
For classification assessments, a total of NCol = 1, 000 collected bursts (NT ng = 500
for training and NT st = 500 for testing) are processed from each device with six likefiltered Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) noise realizations added to each
collected burst. This results in a total of NT ng = 500 × 6 = 3, 000 training and
NT st = 500 × 6 = 3, 000 testing fingerprints being used per device for classification
training and testing assessments as described in Section 3.8. Two classification models are created, per Section 3.8, and used for discrimination assessment, with 1) CMD
results being based on NT st = 12, 000 testing fingerprints per device manufacturer,
and 2) LMD results being based on NT st = 3, 000 fingerprints per device. To stay
consistent with prior related RF-DNA research, an arbitrary performance benchmark
of %C = 90% average cross-class correct classification performance is used for comparative assessment. Summary analysis and conclusions are based on CI = 95%
binomial confidence intervals [44]. When results are presented for a large number of
independent trials (e.g., Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4), the resultant CI = 95% con76

fidence intervals are less than the vertical extent of data markers and omitted for
visual clarity.

4.4.1

Cross-Model Discrimination (CMD).

Figure 4.2 shows average RF-DNA and CB-DNA classification performance for
CMD discrimination. Results show that the %C = 90% benchmark is achieved for
both RF-DNA and CB-DNA at Signal-to-Noise Ratio SN R ≥ 12.0 dB. However,
RF-DNA requires NF eat = 720 total features to achieve this. The CB-DNA approach achieves the benchmark utilizing only NF eat = 112. With respect to CB-DNA
%C results in Figure 4.2a, subclusters and combined fingerprints consistently outperform aggregated fingerprints by approximately 5% across all SN R values, where
combined fingerprints consist of aggregate clusters and subclusters. With fingerprints
generated from combined and subcluster regions having statistically the same performance in Figure 4.2a, only fingerprints based on subcluster points will be compared
to RF-DNA; they consist of 28 less features relative to the number of features in
combined fingerprints. Figure 4.2b provides RF-DNA performance and an overlay
of CB-DNA subcluster results from Figure 4.2a. The RF-DNA results are equal or
slightly better than CB-DNA results at SN R = 10 dB, but have worse performance
at lower SN R values.
While CMD results in Figure 4.2 enable direct comparison of average cross-class
%C performance for RF-DNA and CB-DNA Fingerprinting, they inherently hide class
interaction and individual class performance. Individual class performance is more
accurately analyzed using a conventional classification confusion matrix as described
in Section 3.8. Confusion matrix results exist for all SN R in Figure 4.2 but are only
presented here for two selected SN R to support general conclusions. The MDA/ML
confusion matrices for CMD at SN R = 12.0 dB and SN R = 30.0 dB are presented in
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(a) CB-DNA Fingerprinting %C vs. SN R for CMD using
NC = 4 Classes and NCR = 2 Aggregate, 8 Subcluster,
and 10 Combined Regions.
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(b) RF-DNA Fingerprinting %C vs. SN R for CMD using
NC = 4 Classes and NR = 16, 32, and 80 Subregions.
Figure 4.2. MDA/ML Cross-Model Discrimination (CMD) using (a) CB-DNA and (b)
RF-DNA Fingerprinting [12].

Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, respectively. These matrices highlight correct classification
(diagonal entries) and cross-class misclassification (off-diagonal entries) where matrix
rows represent Input Class and matrix columns represent Called Class. The Input
Class is defined as the ground truth for the input fingerprints. The Called Class is
the results after classification. The table entries are presented as %C CB-DNA /
%C RF-DNA with bold entries denoting best or equivalent performance.
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CB-DNA CMD Fingerprinting benefits considerably with the introduction of subcluster DNA features. Improvement across the range of SNR
considered includes an approximate: 1) 5% to 8% increase in %C, and 2) 5
to 19 dB of “gain,” measured as the reduction in required SNR relative
to what is required for aggregate features to achieve the same %C.
Historically, RF-DNA CMD manufacturer discrimination has been least
challenging. Relative to best case RF-DNA performance, CB-DNA
achieves 1) a marginally poorer 2% decrease in %C for SNR > 12 dB,
and 2) up to 10% improvement in %C for SNR < 12 dB.
The CMD confusion matrices in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 are nearly symmetric
about the diagonal with a majority of the misclassification occurring between DLink
(M1) and TRENDnET (M3) devices. This is attributable to DLink and TRENDnET devices using identical LAN transformers as indicated in Table 4.3. The diagonal correct classification entries show that CMD performance for both RF-DNA
and CB-DNA are generally equivalent at each SN R presented. The resultant CMD
averages for RF-DNA and CB-DNA are pursuant with Figure 4.2 at the corresponding SN R.
Table 4.4. Conventional CMD Classification Confusion Matrix (%) for NC = 4 Classes
at SN R = 12 dB [12]. Presented as %C CB-DNA / %C RF-DNA with Bold Entries
Denoting Superior or Statistically Equivalent Performance.

Called Class
Intel
TRENDnET StarTech

DLink

DLink
83.76 / 87.30 0.0 / 0.02 16.21 / 12.61 0.03 / 0.07
Input
Intel
0.0 / 0.03 100 / 99.9
0.0 / 0.07
0.0 / 0.0
Class
TRENDnET 18.31 / 20.98 0.0 /0.1 81.67 / 78.92 0.02 / 0.0
StarTech
0.0 / 0.02
0.0 / 0.0
0.0 / 0.03
100 / 99.5

The CMD DNA plots in Figure 4.3 were generated by averaging NT st = 250 fingerprints from each device within a given manufacturing group (a total of NT st = 1, 000
fingerprints per manufacturer). The vertical DNA Marker (statistical features) shows
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Table 4.5. Conventional CMD Classification Confusion Matrix (%) for NC = 4 Classes
at SN R = 30 dB [12]. Presented as %C CB-DNA / %C RF-DNA with Bold Entries
Denoting Superior or Statistically Equivalent Performance.

DLink
Input
Class

Called Class
Intel
TRENDnET

StarTech

DLink
97.11 / 99.50 0.0 / 0.01
2.89 / 0.49
0.0 / 0.0
Intel
0.0 / 0.0
100 / 100
0.0 / 0.0
0.0 / 0.0
TRENDnET 2.63 / 0.38
0.0 /0.0 97.37 / 99.62 0.0 / 0.0
StarTech
0.0 / 0.0
0.0 / 0.02
0.0 / 0.0
100 / 99.98

how device fingerprint features vary across the device fingerprints – note that the
displayed value are normalized within each feature such that a maximum (red) value
occurs for each statistic. The horizontal Manufacturer axis shows the device manufacturer identities in Table 3.1. Figure 4.3 provides a visual aide reflecting how device
fingerprints generally differ. Of note here is that manufacturer M1 and M3 fingerprints
appear mostly similar, with the greatest similarity reflected in the RF-DNA fingerprints. This is consistent with the higher level of cross-manufacturer misclassification
occurring between M1 and M3 in the Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 confusion matrices.
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Figure 4.3. CMD CB-DNA and RF-DNA statistical fingerprint visualization with total
number of features per fingerprint in parentheses.
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4.4.2

Like-Model Discrimination (LMD).

Historically, LMD has presented the greatest discrimination challenge for RF-DNA
Fingerprinting given that the devices are assembled using identical components and
may come off the assembly line in the same batch [16, 50]. LMD is also the most
challenging case for CB-DNA when comparing the CMD results from Figure 4.2 with
LMD results in Figure 4.4.
Average %C LMD results are presented in Figure 4.4 for RF-DNA and CB-DNA
Fingerprinting. Results in Figure 4.4b show that the RF-DNA approach never achieves
the %C = 90% benchmark and yields maximum performance of %C ≈ 78% at
SN R = 32.0 dB. The %C = 90% performance benchmark is only achieved by
CB-DNA for SN R ≥ 24.0 dB for combined results and SN R ≥ 26.0 dB for subcluster results.
The confidence interval CI = 95% contained within the data markers suggests that
fingerprints based on combined and subcluster regions are statistically equivalent in
Figure 4.4a. Therefore, as in the CMD case, comparisons with RF-DNA will be done
with only subcluster regions at a reduced feature count of NF eat = 112. The subcluster
CB-DNA performance from Figure 4.4a is superimposed on RF-DNA performance
results in Figure 4.4b for comparison. The comparison shows the best case RF-DNA
performance (NR = 80 regions) is %C ≈ 78% at SN R = 32.0 dB while CB-DNA
reaches %C = 90% at SN R ≈ 24.0 dB. For the LMD case, RF-DNA is the inferior
technique and is outperformed by CB-DNA by approximately 20% at the collected
SN RC = 16.0 dB.
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(a) CB-DNA Fingerprinting %C vs. SN R for LMD using
NC = 16 Classes and NCR = 2 Aggregate, 8 Subcluster,
and 10 Combined Regions.
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(b) RF-DNA Fingerprinting %C vs. SN R for LMD using
NC = 16 Classes and NR = 16, 32, and 80 Subregions.
Figure 4.4. MDA/ML Like-Model Discrimination (LMD) using (a) CB-DNA and (b)
RF-DNA Fingerprinting [12].

CB-DNA LMD Fingerprinting benefits considerably with the introduction of subcluster DNA features. Improvement across the range of SNR
considered includes an approximate: 1) 5% to 22% increase in %C, and
2) 5 to 19 dB of “gain,” measured as the reduction in required SNR relative to what is required for aggregate features to achieve the same %C.
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Historically, RF-DNA LMD serial number discrimination has been most
challenging. Relative to best case RF-DNA performance, CB-DNA is
clearly superior and provides 1) nearly 22% of %C improvement at collected SNR=16 dB, and 2) 9 dB or more “gain” for %C ≥ 70, where
gain is the reduction in SNR relative to what is required by RF-DNA to
achieve the same %C.
As with CMD results in Section 4.4.1, LMD results in Figure 4.4 do not enable
direct comparison of average cross-class %C performance and inherently hide class
interaction and individual class performance. Unlike CMD assessments which were
based on NC = 4 classes (manufacturers), LMD assessments were based on NC = 16
classes (devices) with each class representing one of four devices from one of four
manufacturers. Thus, a conventional LMD confusion matrix would generally contain
16 rows (one input class per row) and 16 columns (one called class per column). As an
alternative, the NC = 16 LMD class results are presented here using unconventional
confusion matrices at SN R = 12 dB and SN R = 30 dB for consistency with previous
CMD analysis. The unconventional confusion matrices are formed here by pooling
results for all four classes (devices) within a given manufacturer, i.e., individual confusion matrix results for all classes (individual devices) for a given manufacturer are
pooled into a manufacturer class and presented in a conventional 4-by-4 confusion
matrix format. Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show pooled LMD classification performance
at SN R = 12 dB and SN R = 30 dB, respectively. In this case, diagonal entries represent that the device was correctly classified as belonging within its manufacturing
group and off-diagonal terms represent all misclassifications attributable to the device
being incorrectly associated with another manufacturer. The table entries are presented as %C CB-DNA / %C RF-DNA with bold entries denoting best or equivalent
performance.
By comparison with prior CMD results in Table 4.4 (SN R = 12 dB) and Table 4.5
(SN R = 30 dB), the corresponding pooled LMD results in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7
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Table 4.6. Unconventional Cross Manufacturer Classification Confusion Matrix (%)
Based on LMD Results for NC = 16 Classes at SN R = 12 dB [12]. Four Classes (Devices)
Within Each Manufactured Pooled for Presentation. Presented as %C CB-DNA / %C
RF-DNA with Bold Entries Denoting Superior or Statistically Equivalent Performance.

M1

Any Called Manufacturer
M2
M3

M4

M1 84.07 / 81.61 0.0 / 0.0
15.93 / 18.84
0.0 / 0.03
Any Input M2
0.0 / 0.0
100 / 99.99
0.0 / 0.01
0.0 / 0.0
Manufacturer
M3 15.98 / 16.11
0.0 / 0.23 84.02 / 83.89 0.0 / 0.0
M4
0.0 / 0.01
0.0 / 0.0
0.0 / 0.0
100 / 99.99
Table 4.7. Unconventional Cross Manufacturer Classification Confusion Matrix (%)
Based on LMD Results for NC = 16 Classes at SN R = 30 dB [12]. Four Classes (Devices)
Within Each Manufactured Pooled for Presentation. Presented as %C CB-DNA / %C
RF-DNA with Bold Entries Denoting Superior or Statistically Equivalent Performance.

M1
M1 97.68 / 99.65
Any Input M2
0.0 / 0.0
Manufacturer
M3 1.69 / 0.25
M4
0.0 / 0.0

Any Called Manufacturer
M2
M3
0.0 / 0.0
2.32 / 0.35
100 / 100
0.0 / 0.0
0.0 / 0.0 98.31 / 99.75
0.0 / 0.0
0.0 / 0.0

M4
0.0 / 0.0
0.0 / 0.0
0.0 / 0.0
100 / 100

reflect overall similar discrimination performance for both RF-DNA and CB-DNA
Fingerprinting methods as the CMD results. This is consistent with expectations
given that the misclassifications within the same manufacturing group are hidden
within the diagonal entries of the confusion matrix.
The unconventional pooled confusion matrices in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 do not
show LMD misclassification occurring within the manufacturer groups. Thus, another
unconventional confusion matrix representation is introduced to assess LMD performance within and across manufacturer groups. One such representation is provided
in Table 4.8 and used to highlight like-manufacturer called class performance using
all devices as input classes (NC = 16). In this representation, the Other Class column
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includes all results where input devices are misclassified as belonging to another manufacturer group (cross-manufacturer error). This confusion matrix representation is
available for all SN R considered. However, representative results are presented here
for SN R = 26.0 dB given that this is the lowest SN R at which CB-DNA performance in Figure 4.4a achieves the %C = 90% benchmark. There are four miniature
confusion matrices in Table 4.8 that represent the like-model confusion within a given
manufacturer group. The four diagonal correct classification entries in Table 4.8 show
that LMD performance for CB-DNA is statistically better than RF-DNA in all but
one case (M3:D3) for the SN R presented. When excluding the M3:D3 case, the
range of improvement of CB-DNA relative to RF-DNA is %C = 13% to 52%. Other
Class entries in Table 4.8 show that the only cross-manufacturer confusion occurs
between DLink (M1) and TRENDnET (M3), which is also attributed to the fact that
they have the same LAN transformer. As the table further shows, M2 and M4 only
experienced misclassification within its own manufacturing group.
The high %C for device M3:D3 is attributable to the alignment jitter discussed in
Section 4.1, where it was shown that Region of Interest (ROI) for this device had a
higher standard deviation than the rest of the devices. With RF-DNA utilizing only
the preamble, which is a much smaller ROI, the misalignment has a more positive
impact on the RF-DNA results for this device. This would also affect the results for
the CMD case. The positive effect on results will also be discussed in the verification
section.
Figure 4.5 is used to visually show how similar/dissimilar like-model fingerprints
are to one another and highlights the difficulty of the process when compared to
CMD. The figure was generated by averaging 1,000 fingerprints from each device
within manufacturer group M2 and was chosen because it had the highest %C of the
4 subtables when excluding M3 due to the alignment jitter in Table 4.8. Therefore,
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it should have the most dissimilar fingerprints. The Y-axis represents the location
of a given statistic within a device fingerprint. The X-axis represents the device as
described in Table 3.1.
Table 4.8. Unconventional LMD Classification Confusion Matrix Highlighting LikeManufacture Confusion for NC = 16 at SN R = 26.0 dB. Presented as %C CB-DNA /
%C RF-DNA with Bold Entries Denoting Superior or Statistically Equivalent Performance [12].

Called Class
M1:D3

M1:D4

Other Class

M1:D1 76.60 / 33.83 0.07 / 11.10

23.20 / 30.60

0.0 / 24.26

0.13 / 0.21

M1:D2 0.17 / 10.03 95.57 / 70.10

2.20 / 8.23

0.87 / 9.63

1.19 / 2.01

87.97 / 57.17 0.53 / 22.70

0.77 / 1.0

Input
Class

M1:D1

M1:D2

M1:D3

9.90 / 9.13

0.83 /10.0

M1:D4

0.37 / 7.40

1.17 / 13.70

M2:D1

M2:D2

M2:D3

M2:D4

Other Class

3.97 / 6.40

3.03 / 1.37

0.70 / 1.17

0.0 / 0.0

10.13/ 22.77

0.0 / 0.0

0.23/ 13.0

0.0 / 0.0

M2:D1 91.63 / 86.53

0.70 / 25.13 85.30 / 53.40 12.46/ 0.37

M2:D2

5.27 / 6.70

83.10 / 57.23 1.50 / 13.30

M2:D3

1.03 / 8.03

1.0 / 11.50

97.73/ 67.47

M2:D4

3.53/ 2.83

6.53/ 21.63

1.03 / 13.57 88.90 / 61.97

M3:D1

M3:D2

0.0 / 0.0

M3:D3

M3:D4

Other Class

M3:D1 92.03 / 60.77 5.43 / 24.43

0.07 / 0.0

1.07 / 14.33

1.40/ 0.47

M3:D2

5.83 / 26.0

91.10 / 59.57

0.17 / 0.0

2.10 / 13.60

0.08 / 0.83

M3:D3

0.03/ 0.0

0.13 / 0.0

99.80 / 100

0.0 / 0.0

0.04 / 0.0

1.93 / 9.80

0.0 / 0.0

M4:D2

M4:D3

M4:D4

Other Class

3.80/ 0.33

4.60/ 5.84

8.10 / 21.90

0.0 / 0.0

M3:D4 2.26 / 11.87
M4:D1
M4:D1 83.50 / 71.93

87.20 / 75.73 8.61 / 2.60

M4:D2

2.90 / 1.33

93.70 / 81.63

1.17 / 7.94

2.23 / 9.10

0.0 / 0.0

M4:D3

6.67/ 6.23

0.67/ 10.90

87.37 / 73.20

5.30 / 9.67

0.0 / 0.0

3.13 / 8.43

5.40 / 9.43

88.10 / 70.97

0.0 / 0.0

M4:D4 3.37 / 11.17

4.5

Device ID Verification
This section provides results for the 1 vs. 1 a “Look How Much Like?” verification

assessments. As stated in Section 3.9, 256 different permutations for NA = 12 autho87
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Figure 4.5. LMD CB-DNA and RF-DNA statistical fingerprint visualization with total
number of features per fingerprint in parentheses.

rized devices and NR = 4 were created from the NC = 16 devices in Table 4.3 with
representative permutations provided in Table 3.3. Specific results are provided for
Perm #29 to guide the discussion on ROC generation and raw test statistic presentation for both authorized and rogue devices. Perm #29 was chosen because it had
the highest %C of the permutations listed in Table 3.3.
Euclidean distance was chosen as the similarity measure for device verification.
The verification results presented in this section use only like-model verification and
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utilize a total of NF eat = 140 CB-DNA and NF eat = 720 RF-DNA features per
fingerprint but are available for fingerprints based on a reduced number of features.
True Verification Rate (T V R) and False Verification Rate (F V R) for Authorized
devices as described in Section 3.9 is based on NT st = 3, 000 fingerprints per device.
Rogue Accept Rate (RAR) and Rogue Reject Rate (RRR) for Rogue Devices are
based on NT st = 6, 000 fingerprints.
Verification is assessed using two network access methods, including 1) ROC
curves for making Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) decisions using test statistic PMFs,
and 2) stem plots of raw Euclidean distance test statistics (ZV ) for making Burst-byBurst (BbB) decisions.
Assessment of Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) verification performance is accomplished using ROC curves, which are generated for authorized and rogue devices
as TVR vs. FVR and TVR vs. RAR, respectively. The T V R vs. RAR presentation
is a matter of convenience and enables 1) direct assessment of rogue performance for
a given authorized device T V R (vertical displacement in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8
are identical), and 2) easy calculation of RRR=1-RAR in Figure 4.8. The PMFs
used to generate Figures 4.6 and 4.8 ROCs are based on independent ZV generated
per Section 3.9 and include a total of NT st = 3, 000 and NT st = 6, 000 fingerprints
per authorized and rogue device, respectively.
For ROC curves in Figure 4.6, BGD success is based on arbitrarily defined criteria,
to stay consistent with other RF-DNA works, such that Authorized Device verification
criteria is T V R > 0.9 and F V R < 0.1. The Authorized Accept Rate (AAR) metric
is common to the T V R metric presented in previous RF-DNA publications as being
the number of authorized access attempts satisfying this criteria divided by the total
number of attempts for a given permutation [49, 50]. The common T V R > 0.9
benchmark is shown as a horizontal dotted line in Figure 4.6, with curves for successful

89

attempts denoted by solid lines and failures denoted by dashed curves.
The RF-DNA and CB-DNA ID verification authorized device ROC curves are
displayed in Figure 4.6 for Perm #29 in Table 3.3 at SN R = 20.0 dB. The dashed
ROC curves in Figure 4.6b for RF-DNA show that only five of the NA = 12 authorized
devices meet the arbitrary T V R > 0.9 and F V R < 0.1 criteria and are not granted
network access (AAR = 41.7%). In addition, there is one device in Figure 4.6b in the
upper left corner; it is the M3:D3 device that had the higher alignment jitter. The
solid ROC curves in Figure 4.6a for CB-DNA show that all but one of the NA = 12
authorized devices meet or exceed the arbitrary T V R < 0.9 and F V R < 0.1
criteria and are granted network access (AAR = 91.7%). The tV (d) verification
threshold values are set according to the Equal Error Rate (EER) line in Figure 4.6.
The BbB verification process for authorized devices is illustrated in Figure 4.7
which shows NT st = 3, 000 Euclidean distance ZV from all authorized devices (A1–A12).
The device dependent verification thresholds tV (d) are indicated by a solid black horizontal line and correspond to EER operating points in Figure 4.6 ROC curves. The
blue circles below the threshold value are device access attempts where the device
was correctly granted network access and the red X’s denote an erroneous rejection
for that device.
For BbB verification assessment, T V R for the dth authorized device is calculated as the number of ZV (d) ≤ tV (d) divided by the total number of ZV (d) with
the percentages for each device being displayed in Table 4.9 along with the verification thresholds tV (d) for each device. The T V R for RF-DNA in Table 4.9 are
84.8% ≤ T V R ≤ 100% and CB-DNA are 88.4% ≤ T V R ≤ 97.8%. Again, it is
seen that M3:D3 (A9) is has the highest T V R due to the alignment jitter.
In the rogue device ROC curves in Figure 4.8, BGD success is based on arbitrarily
defined criteria for Rogue Device verification of T V R > 0.9 and RAR < 0.1, with
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Figure 4.6. ID Verification ROC curves for Perm #29 at SN R = 20 dB using a Euclidean
distance measure of similarity. Relative to Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) network access
decisions CB-DNA authorized device success is AAR = 91.7% (11/12) and RF-DNA
AAR = 41.7% (5/12) for T V R > 0.9 and F V R < 0.1 criteria.
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Figure 4.7. Euclidean distance test statistics for Perm #29 devices at SN R = 20 dB.
Solid horizontal lines are device dependent tV (d) thresholds corresponding to ROC EER
in Figure 4.6. Authorized device (A1–A12) ID verification test statistics where blue
circles indicate correct access granted and red X’s indicate an incorrect access denied
for NT st =3,000 testing fingerprints per authorized device.
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Table 4.9. CB-DNA and RF-DNA Authorized Device Dependent TV (d) Threshold
and TVR Values for Perm #29 at SN R = 20 dB Corresponding to Figure 4.7 with
Bold Entries Denoting Better Performance for TVR Results. Device Dependent tV (d)
Thresholds Corresponding to ROC EER in Figure 4.6.

A1

A2

Authorized Device Index (A#)
A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12

CB-DNA

T V R 90.4 90.7 89.4 93.1 97.1 94.3 91.5 90.6 97.8 91.0 88.4 86.7
TV (d) 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10

RF-DNA

T V R 85.4 85.2 84.8 91.4 87.5 86.6 89.3 89.4 100 86.2 85.7 86.9
TV (d) 1.66 1.69 1.71 2.00 1.91 1.96 1.78 1.81 3.87 1.75 1.82 1.82

RRR being the number of rogue access attempts satisfying this criteria divided by
the total number of attempts. The common T V R > 0.9 benchmark is shown as
a horizontal dotted line and is the same as Figure 4.6, with curves for successful
rejections denoted by solid lines and dashed curves denote when access is wrongly
granted.
Rogue device ROC curves for RF-DNA and CB-DNA ID verification are provided
in Figure 4.8 using Perm #29 devices in Table 3.3 at SN R = 20.0 dB. The solid
RF-DNA ROC curves in Figure 4.8b show that RRR = 34/48 rogue device attempts
met the T V R > 0.9 and RAR < 0.1 criteria and were successfully rejected (denied
network access) at RRR = 70%. The solid CB-DNA ROC curves in Figure 4.8a show
that RRR = 37/48 rogue device attempts met the T V R > 0.9 and RAR < 0.1 criteria
and were successfully rejected (denied network access) at RRR = 77%. CB-DNA is
marginally better and improved RRR by 7% over RF-DNA.
The BbB verification process for rogue devices is illustrated in Figure 4.9, which
shows NT st = 6, 000 Euclidean distance ZV per Perm #29. There were a total of 48
rogue assessment scenarios for this permutation. For visual clarity, only results for 12
of the scenarios are presented and results for only NR(3) = R3 are presented as falsely
claiming each of the authorized device IDs (R3:A1, R3:A2,. . . , R3:A12) in Figure 4.7.
The authorized devices tV (d) correspond to those in Table 4.10 and are used to make
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Figure 4.8. Rogue device ID verification ROC curves for Perm #29 in Table 3.3 at
SN R = 20 dB using a Euclidean distance measure of similarity. Relative to Binary
Grant/Deny (BGD) network access decisions CB-DNA rogue device R3 rejection is
RRR = 77% (37/48) and RF-DNA RRR = 70% (34/48) for T V R > 0.9 and RAR < 0.1
criteria.

BbB grant/deny decisions.
The blue circles above the tV (d) threshold are rogue device rejections where the
rogue device is correctly denied network access. The red X’s below tV (d) are rogue
device acceptances where the rogue is errantly granted network access. In this case,
RRR for dth claimed ID is calculated as the number of ZV (d) > tV (d) divided by the
total number of ZV (d). The tV (d) used for the rogue assessment are in Table 4.10
for RF-DNA and CB-DNA. Table 4.10 also provides RRR values for RF-DNA from
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(a) CB-DNA

(b) RF-DNA
Figure 4.9. Euclidean distance test statistics for Perm #29 rogue devices at SN R =
20 dB. Solid horizontal lines are device dependent tV (d) thresholds corresponding to
ROC EER in Figure 4.6. Rogue device (R3) verification test statistics where blue circles
denote a rogue device being correctly denied access and red X’s denote an incorrect
grant access decision for NT st = 6, 000 BbB testing fingerprints, with R3 presenting a
false ID for each authorized device (R3:A1–R3:A12).
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Table 4.10. CB-DNA and RF-DNA Device Dependent TV (d) Threshold and RRR
Values for Perm #29 at SN R = 20 dB Corresponding to Figure 4.9 with Bold Entries
Denoting Better or Equal Performance for RRR Results. Device Dependent tV (d)
Thresholds Corresponding to ROC EER in Figure 4.6.

CB-DNA

RF-DNA

Rogue : Claimed RRR TV (d) RRR TV (d)
R3:A1

42.0 0.096 78.6 1.660

R3:A2

79.9 0.100 91.0 1.686

R3:A3

14.7 0.091 90.2 1.711

R3:A4

100 0.104 100 1.998

R3:A5

100 0.148 100 1.910

R3:A6

100 0.106 100 1.962

R3:A7

67.1 0.090 24.8 1.779

R3:A8

52.4 0.090 22.7 1.812

R3:A9

96.8 0.128 100 3.867

R3:A10

100 0.098 100 1.749

R3:A11

100 0.104 100 1.817

R3:A12

100 0.095 100 1.821

22.7% ≤ RRR ≤ 100% and CB-DNA ranging from 14.7% ≤ RRR ≤ 100%. For
RF-DNA and CB-DNA, it is clear in Figure 4.9 that R3 (an M3 device) is least
similar to A4, A5, and A6 (M2 devices) and A10, A11, and A12 (M4 devices) given
the corresponding ZV are well above tV (d) for those devices. It is also evident that
when the rogue device was granted access it was thought to be either an M1 or M3
manufacturer. There is one exception in Figure 4.9 for R3:A9 in that R3 was rejected
every time for RF-DNA but gained network access 3.2% of time for CB-DNA. These
results again show that the misalignment jitter impacts both RF-DNA and CB-DNA
however the impact to RF-DNA is higher.
RF-DNA and CB-DNA results in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 are presented as
(#Successes / Total #Trials)×100 with bold entries denoting best or equivalent performance. For binary results, AAR is based on NA = 12 authorized devices trials and
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RRR is based on (NA = 12) × (NR = 4) = 48 total trials. The BbB results are based
on (NA = 12) × (NR = 4) × (NT st = 6, 000) = 288, 000 trials.
Table 4.11. Perm #29 Device ID Verification Performance: Binary Grant/Deny (BGD)
Authorized Accept Rate (AAR) (12 attempts per SNR) and Rogue Reject Rate (RRR)
for BGD (48 Attempts per SNR) and Burst-By-Burst (BbB) (288,000 Attempts per
SNR) Assessments.

CB-DNA
RF-DNA
SNR
BGD
BbB
BGD
BbB
(dB) AAR(%) RRR(%) RRR(%) AAR(%) RRR(%) RRR(%)
8
0
62.5
77.1
0
60.4
74.8
10
0
62.5
78.3
8.3
66.7
76.5
12
16.7
62.5
79.7
8.3
66.7
78.2
14
33.3
64.6
82.2
8.3
66.7
80.0
16
33.3
66.7
84.0
8.3
66.7
82.0
18
50.0
72.9
85.1
25.0
70.8
83.8
20
91.7
77.1
86.2
41.7
70.8
85.4
22
91.7
79.2
87.3
58.3
75.0
86.5
24
100
79.2
88.1
75.0
79.2
87.3
26
100
83.3
88.8
83.3
79.2
87.8
28
100
85.4
89.3
91.7
79.2
88.5
Table 4.11 presents Perm #29 results for all SN R considered and highlights the
direct relationship between SN R and the AAR and RRR for both RF-DNA and
CB-DNA. In addition, Table 4.11 shows that SN R = 24.0 dB is the lowest SN R at
which AAR = 100% for authorized devices. It is also evident in Table 4.11 that the
BbB method consistently outperforms the binary accept/reject decision for both fingerprinting methods at all SN R. As indicted by bold entries in Table 4.11, RF-DNA
results are inferior to CB-DNA for most SN R. The best BGD decision for RF-DNA is
RRR = 79.2% at SN R = 24.0 dB, which is exceeded by CB-DNA at SN R = 26.0 dB.
The confidence interval for these results was calculated to be ±0.1% with 95% confidence.
Table 4.12 provides results for the 10 Perms listed in Table 3.3 and the average
97

overall 12,288 rogue scenarios at SN R = 20.0 dB. This SN R is highlighted to stay
consistent with the other results presented in this section. Binary Grant/Deny Access
results collectively include 70% < RRR < 79% for RF-DNA and 72% < RRR < 79%
for CB-DNA. Burst-by-Burst results jointly include 82% < RRR < 88% for RF-DNA
and 82% < RRR < 89% for CB-DNA. As indicated by the bold entries, RF-DNA
results are generally poorer than CB-DNA. Also of interest is that for the 10 Perms
in Table 4.12, the permutations yielding highest RRR had correspondingly poorer
%C than the permutations yielding lowest RRR – reflecting no direct relationship
between classification and verification performance for both approaches.
Table 4.12. Device ID Verification Performance for 10 Selected Permutations at SN R =
20 dB for Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) AAR (12 attempts per Permutation), RRR (48
Attempts per Permutation) and Burst-By-Burst (BbB) RRR (288,000 Attempts per
Permutation). All Permutations Averages Provided for BGD RRR (12,288 Attempts)
and BbB RRR (Over 73,000,000 Attempts).

Highest %C Lowest %C

CB-DNA
RF-DNA
BGD
BbB
BGD
BbB
Perm# AAR(%) RRR(%) RRR(%) AAR(%) RRR(%) RRR(%)
74
33.3
72.9
86.6
16.7
79.2
87.9
105
25.0
75
89.9
8.3
79.2
88.1
106
25.0
72.9
89.6
25.0
79.2
86.4
107
41.7
72.9
88.9
25.0
79.2
86.4
108
41.7
75.0
88.4
33.3
79.2
86.0
29
91.7
77.1
86.2
41.7
70.8
85.4
32
100
79.1
85.0
66.7
70.8
83.3
157
91.7
72.9
84.7
41.7
70.8
84.5
159
100
70.8
83.1
50
70.8
82.7
160
91.7
72.9
82.5
58.3
70.8
82.3
All Perms
70.0
72.4
85.5
42.6
75.1
85.0
The “All Perms” row in Table 4.12 shows that CB-DNA outperforms RF-DNA
with average RRR of 72.4% and 85.5% for BGD and BbB, respectively. The improvement is ≈ 3% for BGD and ≈ 1.5% for BbB access decisions.
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4.5.1

Alternate Verification Performance Metrics.

This section presents results using alternate verification metrics commonly employed in machine learning applications [38]. These metrics provide insight into individual device performance and are covered here for two purposes: 1) to enable
comparison with other constellation-based works and results as found in [27, 28], and
2) to bridge the gap for researchers accustomed to different metrics. As introduced
in Section 3.11, the alternate metrics include Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and Specificity. The results are only provided for CB-DNA as it has demonstrated superior
performance to RF-DNA.
Numerical results are available for all four metrics. However, the focus of discussion here is on Accuracy. Refereed paper feedback suggests that this is the most
“telling of the four metrics.” The Accuracy metric for a given device reflects: 1) how
reliably the device ID is self-validated and how network access is rightly granted (akin
to T V R), and 2) how resistant the devices ID is to cross-validation error, whereby
its credentials are stolen and used by a rogue device to wrongly gain network access
(akin to RAR). Thus, an Accuracy = 1 for a particular device is desired and reflects
that: 1) the device is appropriately granted access 100% of the time, and 2) rogues
presenting its credentials are denied access 100% of the time.
Figure 4.10 and Table 4.13 contain information specific to Perm #29 and device
NA = A2 (M1:D3), which are used to link the effects of SNR on the accuracy metric
and how it is related to traditional rogue Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curves. The rogue ROC curves in Figure 4.10 contain a total of 8 rogue ROC curves
with four for each of the two presented SN R values. Five of the eight curves are
in the upper left hand corner and not visible suggesting at or near RRR = 100%
while also achieving at or near T V R = 100%. The EER line represents the chosen
operating point.
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Figure 4.10. TVR and RAR for Device M1:M3 at SN R = 14, 30 dB. RAR shown for all
rouge devices NR (i) = R1-R4.

Table 4.13 provides accuracy results across NA = 12 devices for Perm #29 and
highlights the effects of SN R variation on accuracy. The bold entries in this table
correspond to the ROC curves in Figure 4.10 by accounting for all of the ROC curves
for a given SN R value. More succinctly, an individual ROC curve provides metrics for
network access attempts by a individual rogue device against one authorized device,
whereas the accuracy metric accounts for all network access attempts across all rogue
devices against one authorized device.
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Table 4.13. Perm #29 Accuracy Performance for a Given Device with Each Metric
based on 27,000 Tests per Device.

SN R
Device

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

30

M1:D2 0.731 0.763 0.807 0.836 0.843 0.856 0.867 0.886 0.911 0.927 0.935
M1:D3 0.735 0.739 0.761 0.770 0.773 0.782 0.799 0.809 0.815 0.817 0.820
M1:D4 0.735 0.735 0.758 0.767 0.777 0.784 0.788 0.789 0.789 0.790 0.790
M2:D1 0.795 0.797 0.801 0.804 0.807 0.811 0.820 0.826 0.833 0.836 0.836
M2:D3 0.842 0.872 0.904 0.937 0.959 0.974 0.984 0.988 0.990 0.991 0.991
M2:D4 0.798 0.799 0.801 0.803 0.803 0.805 0.804 0.804 0.801 0.801 0.800
M3:D1 0.779 0.792 0.822 0.852 0.880 0.905 0.924 0.941 0.953 0.962 0.967
M3:D2 0.777 0.778 0.819 0.850 0.866 0.883 0.908 0.926 0.945 0.955 0.967
M3:D3 0.819 0.858 0.911 0.947 0.973 0.988 0.996 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999
M4:D2 0.837 0.855 0.869 0.875 0.882 0.892 0.909 0.923 0.934 0.948 0.958
M4:D3 0.804 0.817 0.829 0.839 0.845 0.856 0.863 0.864 0.870 0.875 0.877
M4:D4 0.808 0.826 0.842 0.861 0.871 0.883 0.891 0.897 0.901 0.905 0.908
Mean 0.776 0.788 0.803 0.827 0.845 0.857 0.868 0.880 0.888 0.895 0.901
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4.6

CPA and PPA Enhancements
This section provides results for performance enhancements that include: 1) the

pre-fingerprint generation CPA process developed under this research and described
in Section 3.10.1, and 2) the post-MDA/ML PPA process adopted from prior research
and described in Section 3.10.2. The goal is to improve overall device ID verification
performance using CB-DNA. Results are presented for four different parameter values, including: 1)NCP A = 1 representing no accumulation and NCP A = 9 representing
accumulation of constellation points from symbols in nine bursts, and 2) NP P A = 1
representing no projection averaging, and NP P A = 5 representing the averaging of
five projection bursts in MDA/ML projection space.
Figure 4.11 provides four different RRR assessments for BGD and BbB decisions,
with the blue triangles representing No Enhancement (NCP A = 1 and NP P A = 1),
the red circles representing CPA-Only Enhancement (NCP A = 9 and NP P A = 1), the
green diamonds representing PPA-Only Enhancement (NCP A =1 and NP P A = 5), and
the black squares representing Combined Enhancement (NCP A = 9 and NP P A = 5).
The vertical axis is RRR(%) and the horizontal axis is presented as Rogue Manufacturer ID:Claimed Manufacturer ID (M#:M#). For example, the first horizontal entry in Figure 3.21 is M1:M1 that represents all the times that a rogue device from manufacturing group M1 attempted to gain access as one of the other
three authorized M1 devices. The results in Figure 4.11a, under BGD, are based on
(NA = 3) × (NP erms = 256) × (NR = 1) = 768 individual binary tests for all cases.
Figure 4.11b under BbB results are composed of (NA = 3) × (NP erms = 256) ×
(NR = 1) × (NT st = 6, 000) ≈ 4.6M raw test statistic comparisons with no PPA
(NP P A = 1) and (NA = 3) × (NP erms = 256) × (NR = 1) × (NT st = 6, 000/5) ≈ 92K
raw test statistic with PPA (NP P A = 5) for each M#:M# in the x-axis.
The first four M#:M# entries in the horizontal axis of the individual subfigures
102

80
60
40
20
0

M1:M1
M2:M2
M3:M3
M4:M4
M1:M2
M1:M3
M1:M4
M2:M1
M2:M3
M2:M4
M3:M1
M3:M2
M3:M4
M4:M1
M4:M2
M4:M3

Rogue Reject Rate (%)

100

(a) Binary Grant/Deny

Rogue Reject Rate (%)

100
80
60
40

N CPA =9, N PPA =5
N CPA =1, N PPA =5

20

N CPA =9, N PPA =1

0

M1:M1
M2:M2
M3:M3
M4:M4
M1:M2
M1:M3
M1:M4
M2:M1
M2:M3
M2:M4
M3:M1
M3:M2
M3:M4
M4:M1
M4:M2
M4:M3

N CPA =1, N PPA =1

(b) Burst-by-Burst
Figure 4.11. Constellation Point Accumulation (CPA) and MDA/ML Projection Point
Averaging (PPA) results. Average RRR presented as rogue manufacturer (M#) :
claimed manufacturer (M#) for Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) and Burst-by-Burst (BbB)
decisions across 256 permutations at SNR = 14. Results for no CPA (NCP A =1) and
no PPA (NP P A =1), CPA ONLY (NCP A = 9), PPA ONLY (NP P A = 5),and both CPA
(NCP A =9) and PPA (NP P A =5).

in Figure 4.11 show results for when a rogue device is from the same manufacturer
as the authorized device it is pretending to be, and as expected, the worst RRR
are in that section of each subfigure. The only other time CB-DNA has difficulty
with a lower RRR is when an M1 device is pretending to be an M3 device and vice

103

versa. However, when enhancements due to CPA and PPA are used individually,
verification for M1:M3 and M3:M1 improve ≈ 60% for the BGD Test and ≈ 22% for
BbB. CPA and PPA enhancements see some mixed results when they are individually
used for M1:M1 - M4:M4; however, when the two techniques are combined, an average
increase in RRR over M1:M1 - M4:M4 is 58% ≤ RRR ≤ 95% for BGD Test and
11% ≤ RRR ≤ 60% for BbB. In general, RRR improve to over 78% when both
CPA and PPA enhancements are used.
Also of note is that the BbB test has an average increase in performance of 13%
over BGD test when the rogue device comes from the same manufacturer group. The
BbB test also has an average increase in performance of ≈ 15% and ≈ 11% over BGD
Test for M1:M3 and M3:M1 cases, respectfully. This advantage is eliminated when
the CPA and PPA enhancements are taken into account and RRR becomes more
similar for both methods.
The enhancements also provide increased performance in the accuracy metric
discussed in Section 4.5.1. Individual device accuracy results without enhancements
(NCP A = 1, NP P A = 1) are provided in Table 4.14. Table 4.15 provides individual
device accuracy metrics with enhancements (NCP A = 9, NP P A = 5) with both tables
showing SN R variations. Table 4.14, with no enhancements, has average results
across all devices between 0.77 < Accuracy < 0.90 and when enhancements are
considered, as provided in Table 4.15, accuracy increases to 0.92 < Accuracy < 0.97.
These accuracy results suggest that the CB-DNA approach is able to, on average,
reject more than 90% of the rogue attacks while correctly granting access to authorized
devices more than 90% of time.
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Table 4.14. Device Accuracy Across All Permutations with no Enhancements with
Each Metric based on 5.1M+ Tests per Device.

SN R
Device

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

M1:D1 0.741 0.744 0.753 0.774 0.799 0.822 0.846 0.869 0.887 0.899 0.906
M1:D2 0.713 0.734 0.760 0.788 0.816 0.841 0.866 0.888 0.908 0.923 0.935
M1:D3 0.748 0.759 0.773 0.794 0.815 0.836 0.856 0.876 0.892 0.903 0.911
M1:D4 0.731 0.746 0.764 0.785 0.807 0.827 0.846 0.862 0.875 0.885 0.893
M2:D1 0.798 0.800 0.803 0.809 0.816 0.826 0.837 0.849 0.860 0.869 0.876
M2:D2 0.798 0.799 0.802 0.810 0.823 0.834 0.843 0.850 0.855 0.859 0.862
M2:D3 0.808 0.823 0.841 0.870 0.900 0.923 0.937 0.946 0.950 0.954 0.957
M2:D4 0.802 0.805 0.811 0.825 0.842 0.857 0.869 0.879 0.886 0.892 0.897
M3:D1 0.752 0.764 0.781 0.800 0.821 0.840 0.858 0.872 0.884 0.894 0.902
M3:D2 0.724 0.738 0.755 0.779 0.805 0.826 0.847 0.865 0.881 0.892 0.900
M3:D3 0.756 0.794 0.832 0.859 0.878 0.897 0.915 0.929 0.938 0.943 0.946
M3:D4 0.719 0.738 0.759 0.782 0.803 0.821 0.837 0.850 0.862 0.872 0.881
M4:D1 0.807 0.809 0.811 0.813 0.818 0.823 0.829 0.835 0.841 0.846 0.852
M4:D2 0.820 0.829 0.837 0.846 0.855 0.867 0.882 0.896 0.910 0.921 0.930
M4:D3 0.805 0.808 0.812 0.818 0.824 0.831 0.841 0.851 0.858 0.866 0.873
M4:D4 0.808 0.814 0.823 0.831 0.840 0.848 0.855 0.861 0.867 0.873 0.878
Mean 0.771 0.781 0.795 0.811 0.829 0.845 0.860 0.874 0.885 0.893 0.900
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Table 4.15. Device Accuracy Across All Permutations with Enhancements for NCP A = 9
and NP P A = 5 Based on 1M+ Tests per Device.

SN R
Device

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

26

28

M1:D1 0.917 0.919 0.921 0.926 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.929 0.928 0.927 0.927
M1:D2 0.971 0.988 0.998 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999
M1:D3 0.921 0.922 0.924 0.925 0.925 0.926 0.926 0.927 0.927 0.928 0.930
M1:D4 0.855 0.865 0.870 0.878 0.885 0.895 0.908 0.926 0.943 0.956 0.966
M2:D1 0.912 0.919 0.925 0.941 0.947 0.952 0.967 0.982 0.992 0.997 0.998
M2:D2 0.910 0.921 0.927 0.945 0.965 0.978 0.986 0.992 0.996 0.997 0.998
M2:D3 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
M2:D4 0.972 0.980 0.993 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
M3:D1 0.954 0.958 0.963 0.961 0.955 0.953 0.956 0.966 0.976 0.983 0.987
M3:D2 0.932 0.942 0.950 0.948 0.942 0.934 0.935 0.953 0.970 0.980 0.984
M3:D3 0.856 0.859 0.877 0.891 0.895 0.902 0.910 0.926 0.939 0.944 0.950
M3:D4 0.874 0.891 0.895 0.883 0.857 0.836 0.831 0.836 0.836 0.840 0.841
M4:D1 0.876 0.870 0.877 0.901 0.928 0.962 0.988 0.992 0.993 0.992 0.990
M4:D2 0.977 0.983 0.995 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997
M4:D3 0.870 0.867 0.875 0.895 0.919 0.933 0.944 0.952 0.960 0.965 0.967
M4:D4 0.911 0.916 0.916 0.922 0.938 0.958 0.973 0.983 0.988 0.988 0.988
Mean 0.919 0.925 0.931 0.938 0.943 0.947 0.953 0.960 0.965 0.968 0.970
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4.7

Sensitivity Analysis and Probe Placement
This section provides results for effects to projected constellation points (shapes

of constellations), classification and verification results as the probe-to-card distance
LP increases from 2 to 98 m. It also validates Config #1 classification results for
CMD and LMD from Section 4.4. Furthermore, verification results for Perm #29
Section 4.5 with Config #2 and probe-to-card distance of LP ≈ 2 m is also validated.
The addition of Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to the collected signal is
investigated to see if it provides accurate SNR variation on CMD and LMD results.
The projected device constellations in Figure 4.12 show how a representative device constellation changes from a card distance LP ≈ 2 m (Figure 4.12a) to LP ≈ 98 m
(Figure 4.12b). A representative device (D1) is presented for each of the four manufacturers (M1-M4). The effects of an increase on LP distance can be clearly seen
in Figure 4.12 as the subclusters of the projected constellations are not as elongated
when LP ≈ 98 m. Receiver coloration has a potential to make some changes on the
presentation of the projected symbols. This is seen when comparing Figure 3.15 and
Figure 4.12a, which shows some slight movement in the projected subclusters but
their relative shapes appear to be the same.

4.7.1

Sensitivity Analysis: Device Classification.

The effect of collection probe and Ethernet card separation distance on average
cross-class %C performance was addressed, i.e., the variation in %C as the probe-tocard distance LP increases. Config #2 with LP ≈ 2 m (Rx 2:Cable 2) was used to
validate original results from Config #1 with LP ≈ 2 m (Rx 1:Cable 1). Config #2
was used to vary the probe-to-card distance for LP ≈ 2 m and LP ≈ 98 m. Results
are presented here for the maximum 10BASE-T cable length of LC = 100 m, as
specified in IEEE 802 [1]. Figure 4.13 presents CMD (left) and LMD (right) results
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(a) Config #2 with LP ≈ 2 m
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(b) Config #2 with LP ≈ 98 m
Figure 4.12. The effects of cable-to-probe linear distance on constellation shapes at
SN R = 26 dB for both LP ≈ 2 m and LP ≈ 98 m collection points. Representative device
(D1) is presented for each of the manufacturers (M1-M4).

for Config #1 at LP ≈ 2 m, Config #2 at LP ≈ 2 m, and LP ≈ 98 m with a
theoretical variation of SN R = {2x|x ∈, 2 < x < 32} dB for both configurations.
The vertical dashed lines in Figure 4.13 denote the collected SN R value for each
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Ave Percent Correct (%C)

configuration and LP combination with the same color as the %C curve it represents.
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(a) CMD for Config #1 and Config #2
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(b) LMD for Config #1 and Config #2
Figure 4.13. The effects of cable to probe linear distance on CMD and LMD for varying
SNR values. Collected SNR values for each configuration and LP combination denoted
as a dashed vertical line with same color as %C curve.

The CMD results for Config #1 and Config #2 at LP ≈ 2 m and LP ≈ 98 m
are presented in Figure 4.13a and have similar %C classification across all SNRs,
which provides evidence for validation of the CB-DNA process. The CMD results
for Config #2 at LP ≈ 2 m and LP ≈ 98 m do not provide enough evidence to
suggest that adding AWGN is a good indication of probe distance since both results
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for Config #2 are statistically the same.
The LMD results for Config #1 and Config #2 at LP ≈ 2 m in Figure 4.13b
provide additional evidence pointing towards validation of the process. An interesting
observation in the LMD is that Config #2 at LP ≈ 98 m outperforms the other two
at the collected SN R. This fact does not support the idea that adding AWGN to
the collected signal at one collected SN R is representative of the actual performance
at a lower SN R. However, Config #1 and Config #2 at LP ≈ 2 m have different
collection SN R values of SN R = 16 dB and SN R = 28 dB, respectively. The
predicted %C for Config #2 at SN R = 16 dB is very close to the actual collected
SN R for Config #1 providing some evidence that adding AWGN at various powers
does provide insight to classification performance at different collected SN Rs. This
suggests that the additions of AWGN is not tied to probe location and further study
of this effect is required.

4.7.2

Sensitivity Analysis: Device ID Verification.

Verification was re-accomplished using Perm #29 at LP ≈ 2 m for Config #2 and
the results are compared to Config #1 at SN R = 26 dB. From this point forward,
results for Config #1 will be presented above Config #2 for all figures. The authorized
device ROC curves for both configurations are in Figure 4.14 in which Config #1
has a higher BGD AAR of AAR = 97.7% versus Config #2 of AAR = 58.3%.
For Config #2, the five devices that did not meet the previously defined criteria of
T V R > 0.9 and F V R < 0.1 were from manufacturing group M1 and M3. This is
different from Config #1 where an M4 device was the sole manufacturer not meeting
the criteria. It is expected that the use of different collection configurations will
provide some variation in the results. However, Config #2 has similar alignment
jitter for all devices, which removes the advantage of device (M3:D3) for Config #1.
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Figure 4.14. Config #1 and Config #2 validation at LP ≈ 2 m of CB-DNA ID verification
ROC curves for Perm #29 in Table 3.3 at SN R = 20 dB using a Euclidean distance
measure of similarity. Relative to Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) network access decisions
Config #1 authorized device success is AAR = 91.7% (11/12) and Config #2 AAR = 58.3%
(7/12) for T V R > 0.9 and F V R < 0.1 criteria.

The individual BbB test statistic for Config #1 and Config #2 for authorized
devices is in Figure 4.15 with overall BbB percentage results and Tv (d) threshold
values corresponding the EER in Figure 4.14, which can be found in Table 4.16. Also
summarized in Table 4.16 is the T V R results based on BbB comparisons. Config #1
and Config #2 BbB results presented in Figure 4.15 and Table 4.16 provide validation
evidence on the CB-DNA approach for authorized device verification.
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Figure 4.15. Config #1 and Config #2 validation at LP ≈ 2 m of CB-DNA Euclidean
distance test statistics for Perm #29 devices at SN R = 20 dB. Solid horizontal lines are
device dependent tV (d) thresholds corresponding to ROC EER in Figure 4.14. Authorized Device (A1–A12) ID verification test statistics where blue circles indicate correct
access granted and red X’s indicate incorrect access denied for NT st =3,000 testing fingerprints per authorized device.
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Table 4.16. CB-DNA Config #1 and Config #2 with LP = 2 m Authorized Device
Dependent TV (d) Threshold and TVR Values for Perm #29 at SN R = 20 dB Corresponding to Figure 4.15 with Bold Entries Denoting Better Performance for TVR
Results. Device Dependent tV (d) Thresholds Corresponding to ROC EER in Figure 4.6.

Config #1 Config #2
T V R TV (d) T V R TV (d)
A1

90.4 0.096 84.5 0.103

A2

90.7 0.100 91.5 0.105

A3

89.4 0.091 82.2 0.092

A4

93.1 0.104 93.4 0.132

A5

97.1 0.148 98.1 0.172

A6

94.3 0.106 94.1 0.141

A7

91.5 0.090 85.1 0.097

A8

90.6 0.090 85.1 0.096

A9

97.8 0.128 85.0 0.116

A10

91.0 0.098 92.7 0.109

A11

88.4 0.104 97.4 0.129

A12

86.7 0.095 91.0 0.105

Mean 91.8

90.0
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The rogue device ROC curves show a different result than the authorized ROC
curves in that the RRR, is based on the BGD access decision of T V R > 0.9 and
RAR < 0.1. The results for Config #1, is lower than Config #2 at RRR = 77% and
RRR = 83.3%, respectively. These results provide additional rogue device evidence
for the validation of the CB-DNA approach.
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(a) Rogue ROC Curves Config #1
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Figure 4.16. Config #1 and Config #2 validation at LP ≈ 2 m of rogue device ID
verification ROC curves for Perm #29 in Table 3.3 at SN R = 20 dB using a Euclidean
distance measure of similarity. Relative to Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) network access
decisions Config #1 rogue device R3 rejection is RRR = 77% (37/48) and Config #2
RRR = 83.3% (40/48) for T V R > 0.9 and RAR < 0.1 criteria.
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The BbB results presented in Figure 4.17 and Table 4.17 again show that the only
confusion for rogue access is between manufacturer devices M1 and M3.

(a) Rogue Test Stats Config #1
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Figure 4.17. Config #1 and Config #2 validation at LP ≈ 2 m of CB-DNA Euclidean
distance test statistics for Perm #29 rogue devices at SN R = 20 dB. Solid horizontal
lines are device dependent tV (d) thresholds corresponding to ROC EER in Figure 4.14.
Rogue device (R3) verification test statistics with blue circles denote a rogue device
being correctly denied access and red X’s denote an incorrectly granted access decision
for NT st = 6, 000 BbB testing fingerprints, with rogue device R3 presenting a false ID
for each authorized device (R3:A1–R3:A12).

The individual BbB test statistic for Config #1 and Config #2 for rogue devices
is in Figure 4.17 with overall BbB RRR percentage results and Tv (d) threshold values
corresponding the EER in Figure 4.14, which can be found in Table 4.17.
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Table 4.17. CB-DNA Config #1 and Config #2 with LP = 2 m Device Dependent
TV (d) Threshold and RRR Values for Perm #29 at SN R = 20 dB Corresponding to
Figure 4.14 with Bold Entries Denoting Better Performance. Device Dependent tV (d)
Thresholds Corresponding to ROC EER in Figure 4.14.

Config #1

Config #2

(Rogue : Claimed) RRR TV (d) RRR TV (d)
R3:A1

42.0 0.096 45.7 0.103

R3:A2

79.9 0.100 90.2 0.105

R3:A3

14.7 0.091 45.5 0.092

R3:A4

100 0.104 100 0.132

R3:A5

100 0.148 100 0.172

R3:A6

100 0.106 100 0.141

R3:A7

67.1 0.090 50.1 0.097

R3:A8

52.4 0.090 41.6 0.096

R3:A9

96.8 0.128 24.3 0.116

R3:A10

100 0.098 100 0.109

R3:A11

100 0.104 100 0.129

R3:A12

100 0.095 100 0.105

Mean

79.4

74.8

The general conclusions for AWGN show that the experimental LC = 100 m
assessment were not consistent with the theoretical assessment when using the same
receiver and cable at different LP values; however, the experimental assessment was
consistent with the theoretical assessment at the same LP ≈ 2 m but utilizing different
receivers and cables. The results for Config #2 were generally validated by the results
from Config #1 at LP ≈ 2 m.
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V. Summary and Conclusions

This chapter provides the summary and conclusions for the main research elements, results, as well as topic areas of focus for future research. Section 5.1.1 summarizes the Single Slope (SSLP) and Constellation Based (CB) symbol estimation processes. Device Classification as a 1 vs. M “Looks Most Like?” assessment, and Device
ID Verification as a “Looks How Much Like?” assessment for authenticating bit-level
credentials are addressed for Radio Frequency-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA)
and Constellation Based-Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) Fingerprinting processes. Both fingerprinting processes were investigated over a range of Signal-to-Noise
Ratio SN R values utilizing 16 devices from four manufacturers (DLink (M1), Intel
(M2), TRENDnET (M3), and StarTech (M4)) with four devices from each manufacturer. The adopted RF-DNA process is covered in Section 5.1.2. Section 5.1.3
concludes the newly developed CB-DNA Fingerprinting process, and the impact of
two process enhancements for Constellation Point Accumulation (CPA) and Projection Point Averaging (PPA) follows in Section 5.1.4. The summary of the comparison
between the two approaches is provided in Section 5.1.5 prior to finishing with relevant
future work in Section 5.2.

5.1

Research Summary
Cyber security threats are on the top 10 list of concerns for many security-minded

enterprises as indicated by: 1) a 2014 survey of Fortune 1,000 companies which listed
cyber as the number one concern during the previous five years [55], 2) the American
Security Project considering cyber as its number two threat in 2015 [30], and 3) the
United States Intelligence Office listing cyber as its number three concern [3].
Some of these same cyber security threats are also of concern within the Indus-
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trial Control Systems (ICS) enterprise. One of the most concerning elements of these
threats involves Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Process
Control System (PCS) implementations that are migrating away from legacy Information Technology (IT) architectures to more modern Internet Protocol (IP)-based
connections [29]. Modern IP-based connections (e.g., Modbus/TCP, Ethernet/IP
and DNP3) are being used to provide critical communications to/from control devices [7, 61] and security vulnerabilities remain a concern of those connections. Common ICS vulnerabilities include critical platforms being inadequately protected which
allow nonessential personnel direct access to equipment, as well as having open access
to wireless and wired ports in common work areas [46,58]. Many protocols and architectures built for ICS applications were designed without security measure concerns
and include no means for verifying the authenticity of remote users or devices [46,61].
These vulnerabilities make it easy for potential attackers to easily gain ICS network
access and exploit hardware, operating systems, and/or executables [46].
Some of the ICS network security and control vulnerabilities can be addressed using the CB-DNA Fingerprinting method demonstrated under this research, with the
envisioned implementation being used to augment bit-level mechanisms. CB-DNA
Fingerprinting can also be used: 1) by asset owners to support ICS asset management by classifying devices, components, and performing sensor Identification (ID),
2) by compliance personnel to support ICS security audits through verifying device,
component, and/or sensor status (unchanged or changed accidentally, intentionally,
or maliciously), and 3) for post-incident event ICS triage to assess device, component,
and/or sensor status to help determine if the cause of the incident is an incidental
failure, intentional rogue activity, etc.
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5.1.1

Symbol Estimation.

As developed under this research and documented in [10, 11], the technique for
passive collection and exploitation of unintentional Ethernet cable emissions is effective and advances the body of knowledge on Side-Channel Analysis (SCA). Previous
wired responses that were considered for SCA used signals that were extracted from
field phone lines [24], RS-232 cables [56], power lines [21], and Ethernet cables [27,28];
these prior works focused on 1) monitor video reconstruction, 2) keystroke recognition, and 3) data extraction, versus communication symbol estimation as done under
this research. The SSLP symbol estimation technique developed herein [10], uses
unintentional emissions, and enables subsequent development of the CB symbol estimation process [11]. The resultant CB symbol estimation method not only provides
a reliable, alternate method to perform symbol estimation, but the corresponding
symbol constellation provides the basis for generating unique CB device fingerprints
and development of the CB-DNA Fingerprinting approach.
The resultant Bit Error Rate (BER) for the two methods is BER = 4.28x10−7 and
BER = 7.46x10−7 for SSLP and CB, respectively. These BERs are approximately
the same and sufficient for Ethernet operation, as well as providing confidence in the
fingerprint generation from the projected non-conventional constellations developed
in this research.

5.1.2

RF-DNA Fingerprinting.

This work successfully implemented the RF-DNA approach in [17, 50] and the
wired Ethernet results here are consistent with prior related wireless results in [31,
33, 51, 73, 74]. Results include RF-DNA Cross-Model Discrimination (CMD), where
different manufactures were easily discernible with %C = 91.4% at SN R = 12 dB
and %C = 99.7% at SN R = 30 dB. Like-Model Discrimination (LMD) was generally
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poorer than other device discrimination results [48, 50] implementing the RF-DNA
approach with results, here, being %C = 67.6% at SN R = 26 dB.
Variation in standards between wired and wireless signaling characteristics, and
many devices here share similar LAN transformer markings provide a couple of reasons for RF-DNAs generally poorer performance in LMD. Furthermore, the derivative
effects of the probe on the transmitted burst can also hide some potential discriminating evidence in the preamble.
The RF-DNA device ID verification performance is also limited by the same effects
that limit its classification performance and also results in generally poorer verification
performance when comparing previously related work [47, 50].

5.1.3

CB-DNA Fingerprinting.

This work successfully collected and analyzed wired Ethernet emissions for the
purpose of creating a non-conventional constellation in support of symbol estimation of cable emissions and device discrimination utilizing the developed CB-DNA
approach herein. CB-DNA discrimination performance was investigated using two
configurations: 1) Config #1 (oscope #1, cable #1 of length LC = 8 m), and 2) Config #2 (oscope #2, cable #2 of length LC = 100 m) where Config #2 was used to
validate the CB-DNA results from Config #1 at LP ≈ 2 m.
For experimental Config #1, CB-DNA CMD Fingerprinting benefits considerably
with the introduction of subcluster DNA features. Improvement across the range of
SNR considered includes an approximate: 1) 5% to 8% increase in %C, and 2) 5 to 19
dB of “gain,” measured as the reduction in required SNR relative to what is required
for aggregate features to achieve the same %C.
Historically, RF-DNA LMD serial number discrimination has been most challenging. Relative to best case RF-DNA performance, CB-DNA is clearly superior and
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provides 1) nearly 22% of %C improvement at collected SNR=16 dB, and 2) 9 dB
or more “gain” for %C ≥ 70, where gain is the reduction in SNR relative to what is
required by RF-DNA to achieve the same %C.
These results were revalidated by processing additional collections for CB-DNA
with experimental Config #2, where similar results were achieved at a probe location
LP = 2 m from the transmitting Device Under Test (DUT). The sensitivity analysis
conducted at LP = 98 m showed improved performance across all SN R which is
believed to be a result of fine burst alignment variations. Both configurations showed
that the misclassification error for CMD occurred between DLink (M1) and TRENDnET (M3) devices near 100% of the time. The misclassification error appears to be
directly tied to the fact that both manufacturers use the same LAN transformer [12].
For LMD there was some obvious confusion within a manufacturing group. However,
any misclassification outside of a device’s own manufacturer only occurred between
DLink (M1) and TRENDnET (M3).
The like-model verification results provide adequate Rogue Reject Rate (RRR)
and True Verification Rate (T V R) for network security implementation. The likemodel verification results for CB-DNA utilizing the Binary Grant/Deny (BGD) decision are 65% < RRR < 86% at SN R = 20 dB and 25% < T V R ≤ 100%.
The Burst-by-Burst (BbB) metric results at values of 81% < RRR < 93% and
88% < T V R < 92% at SN R = 20 dB are typically higher than BGD. The common LAN transformer also affects verification in much the same way as classification
for manufacturers DLink (M1) and TRENDnET (M3). It was concluded that all
network access attempts outside of a manufacturing group that resulted in Rogue
Accepts (RA) are only between DLink (M1) and TRENDnET (M3). This suggests
that LAN transformer RF characteristics influences fingerprint features and impact
the ability to perform Ethernet card ID Verification across manufacturers.
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Prior work that performs CB device discrimination primarily relies on symbol
estimation errors to generate device signatures (i.e., fingerprints) [6, 8, 19, 25, 35].
Conducting a direct comparison of results between these prior works and the current
research are difficult for multiple reasons: 1) incomplete methodologies, 2) terminology differences, 3) no SN R variations, 4) discrimination techniques variances, and
5) different devices. However, CB-DNA generally provides improved T V R = 95%
relative to [6] which presents a T V R ≈ 90%. Another metric used by [6, 35] is accuracy, which is not defined in either document, but is reported as accuracy ≈ 99% in
both works. CB-DNA provides similar results by achieving accuracy = 97%.
One last method for comparison is a correlation-based approach [27,28] to exploit
10BASE-T Ethernet preambles and is most closely related to the research presented
herein. The work in [27, 28] provides accuracy results over multiple methods that
range from 90% < accuarcy < 99%. The CB-DNA approach developed in this
research provides consistent results ranging from 90% < accuarcy < 97%. Benefits
of the CB-DNA method herein include: 1) only requiring external cable access and
not individual twisted wire pairs inside the cable, 2) using sample rates that can be
4 to 10 times lower, and 3) operating at lower SN R while still achieving desirable
Authorized Accept Rate (AAR) and RRR.

5.1.3.1

Conditional Constellation Features.

This research introduces conditional constellation features as a means to exploit
additional information contained in aggregate CB non-conventional constellation clusters, i.e., the two projected clusters representing Binary 1 and one Binary 0 transmissions. Conditional assignment of symbol projections to multiple subclusters forming
the aggregate clusters was introduced here using a sequence of three consecutive symbols (bits), including the concatenation of 1) the prior estimated bit value, 2) the
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current bit being assigned, and 3) the subsequent estimated bit value; a total of four
possible prior/subsequent estimated bit combinations and four subclusters per binary
aggregate cluster. None of the prior related RF-DNA or CB-DNA works address fingerprinting devices using conditional symbol features. CB-DNA Fingerprinting using
conditional subcluster to create dependent features proved to be very effective and
improved %C by 5% (CMD) and 25% (LMD) relative to using features based only
on binary aggregate clusters. The performance increase of %Ci = 25% for LMD
provides evidence that the conditional subcluster features helped alleviate confusion
of DLink (M1) and TRENDnET (M3) devices which share a common LAN transformer. Providing further evidence is when aggregate clusters and subclusters are
combined for LMD, the performance increase is only %Ci < 2% relative to just subcluster performance and is within the CI = 95% confidence interval. Even though
the aggregate subclusters do provide decent classification results, the true power of
the CB-DNA technique lies within the subclusters and the generation of dependent
features introduced in this research.
The novel discovery of the dependent features generated from conditional subclusters allows the CB-DNA technique the ability to achieve performance for LMD that
was previously only achievable when performing CMD.

5.1.4

CPA and PPA Enhancements.

Two types of performance enhancements were considered, including: 1) CPA
where projected constellation points were accumulated for a specific number of bursts
prior to fingerprint feature generation, and 2) PPA where fingerprints projections in
the MDA/ML Fisher space are averaged prior to test statistic generation. CPA is
a new method developed under this research for CB-DNA and not implementable
in RF-DNA. PPA was previously considered for use in the Air Force Institute of
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Technology (AFIT) RFINT program.
The utilization of CPA method for CB-DNA provides a Rogue rejection performance increase of RRRi = 19.7% for BbB and RRRi = 42.5% for BGD decisions relative to no CPA. The PPA method also experiences improvement in Rogue rejection
performance results with an increase of RRRi = 23.8% for BbB and RRRi = 52.9%
for BGD decisions relative to no PPA. The highest increase in Rogue rejection performance occurs when both techniques were combined resulting in an increase of
RRRi = 33.3% for BbB and RRRi = 82.9% for BGD decisions relative to no CPA
and no PPA. The results for combined CPA and PPA enhancements show an increase
in rogue rejection to RRR ≈ 98% between DLink (M1) and TRENDnET (M3) devices. It is evident that both enhancements helped alleviate confusion between DLink
(M1) and TRENDnET (M3) devices due to their common LAN transformers. The
increased ID Verification performance gains by CPA and PPA provide the potential
for a more stringent device verification threshold.

5.1.5

RF-DNA vs. CB-DNA.

This work is the only known work to consider a direct comparison of RF-DNA
and CB-DNA methods using identical collected emissions. A benefit of performing
comparative device discrimination assessments using identical collected emissions is
that it enables a direct comparison between approaches. Comparison of results for
two techniques based on different emissions, collected with different hardware configurations and equipment, can induce potential biases and errantly sway conclusions.
The RF-DNA performance used here for unintentional Ethernet emissions are consistent with prior works [31,33,51,73,74] for other signals and show that LMD is more
challenging than CMD. LMD was also more challenging than CMD for CB-DNA,
however CB-DNA managed to achieve the %C > 90% benchmark highlighting its

124

superior classification ability for this type of response. Device ID Verification results
were more similar between the two approaches. It is believed that the RF-DNA
approach had an advantage over CB-DNA because misalignment affects NR = 1
subregion and consequently affects NF eat = 9 features. The effect of one projected
symbol error for CB-DNA fingerprinting only affects at most NCR = 3 subcluster
regions, and the NSym = 80+ symbols within each subcluster help to mitigate the
misalignment effects. No one feature is based solely on the misaligned region as it
is with RF-DNA. Evaluating the amount of the advantage RF-DNA experiences
for this data set would require identifying the most relevant features for classification which Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) is not
capable of doing.
CB-DNA is more applicable to an operational transition [50] due to the smaller
feature set required for better performance. This assessment is based on the performance of both techniques and the number of features needed to achieve their
respective performance (CB-DNA, Nf eats = 112 vs. RF-DNA, Nf eats = 720).

5.2

Future Research Topic Areas
This section outlines potential future work that could be accomplished either

as a natural progression for extending CB-DNA Fingerprinting applicability or to
addresses specific peculiarities discovered during development and warranting further
consideration.

5.2.1

Conventional Constellation CB-DNA Fingerprinting.

The collected emissions and received constellation space used here to develop
and demonstrate conditional CB-DNA Fingerprinting were not based on a conventional communication signaling constellation. However, this does not limit conditional
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CB-DNA applicability. The natural progression of the research is to consider conventional higher-order constellations such as Phase Shift Keying (PSK), Phase Amplitude
Modulation (PAM), and Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM). There is community interest in pursuing this extension, as the results would enable more direct
comparison with previous CB device discrimination work in [6, 8, 19, 25, 35], which
did not utilize conditional features. The additional work could also consider an alternative projection space for the higher-order modulations such that were done here
for the non-conventional binary constellation using waveform slope in/near symbol
transition boundaries.

5.2.2

Probe Placement Analysis.

Collection probe placement along the Ethernet cable was done entirely through
oscilloscope observations, with an “acceptable” location being one that produced a
near-maximum amplitude response. It was experimentally observed that varying the
probe orientation (linear translation and rotation) along the cable affected collected
SN R levels and that pressure variation impacted the signal responses, as well. The
effects of these variations on CB-DNA Fingerprinting performance requires further
study and a non-visual approach to probe placement should be considered.

5.2.3

Ethernet Traffic Load Effects.

Only one of four Twisted Wire Pair (TWP) in the Ethernet cable were active
to support DUT operation for this research. This benign environment was sufficient
for initial proof-of-concept demonstration. Additional cable traffic loading should be
considered for future studies. The cross-TWP interference effects in a more malign
environment with higher traffic loads is expected to have some effect on both BER and
CB-DNA device discrimination performance. The degree of degradation in a malign
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environment remains to be determined. Further study is warranted to characterize
performance for higher traffic rates occurring across multiple TWP.

5.2.4

Bit Error Rate (BER) Effects.

The effects of BER on conditional constellation projection assignment were deemed
insignificant given that there was, on average, only one bit error occurring for every
NF ≈ 500 processed fingerprints. As noted in Section 5.2.3, an increase in Ethernet
traffic on other TWP is expected to increase BER and likely result in more projected
symbols being incorrectly assigned to constellation subregions. The resultant effect
may be similar to increasing SN R which results in degraded device discrimination
performance. A follow-on study is suggested to assess the impact of increasing BER
on conditional CB-DNA Fingerprinting performance.

5.2.5

Expansion to 100BASE-T.

The CB-DNA Fingerprinting approach was developed herein using 10BASE-T
Ethernet cable emissions. Potential applicability to higher Ethernet speeds, such as
100BASE-T, is of interest. The lower speed of 10BASE-T is not a limiting factor
for ICS applications given that a majority of ICS implementations are/will be using
10BASAE-T [7,61]. However, support for higher speeds is essential, and the CB-DNA
approach should be expanded to address higher Ethernet speeds. This expansion is
similar to what has been historically done for RF-DNA Fingerprinting using multiple
wireless protocols, e.g., Zigbee [48], WiMAX [50], and WiFi [37].

5.2.6

Alternate Classifiers.

The MDA/ML classification technique used here has an inherent limitation of
not being able to discern which of the input features are most relevant to the final
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classification decision [50]. It is recommended that additional CB-DNA Fingerprinting demonstrations be conducted using an alternate classifier to identify the most
relevant features. This resultant feature relevance ranking can then be used to select the best, reduced dimensional, subset of features and enhance operational transition opportunity. Two other potential classifiers that support post-classification
feature relevance ranking are Generalized Relevance Learning Vector QuantizedImproved (GRLVQI) [50] and Support Vector Machine (SVM) [6]. Even if these
classifiers do not produce adequate classification performance, their relevance ranking will be useful for selecting reduced dimensional subsets for MDA/ML processing.
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